Foraging swarms as Nash equilibria of dynamic games

Date
2014
Authors
Özgüler, A. B.
Yildiz, A.
Advisor
Supervisor
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Source Title
IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics
Print ISSN
2168-2267
Electronic ISSN
Publisher
IEEE
Volume
44
Issue
6
Pages
979 - 987
Language
English
Type
Article
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
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Abstract

The question of whether foraging swarms can form as a result of a noncooperative game played by individuals is shown here to have an affirmative answer. A dynamic game played by N agents in 1-D motion is introduced and models, for instance, a foraging ant colony. Each agent controls its velocity to minimize its total work done in a finite time interval. The game is shown to have a unique Nash equilibrium under two different foraging location specifications, and both equilibria display many features of a foraging swarm behavior observed in biological swarms. Explicit expressions are derived for pairwise distances between individuals of the swarm, swarm size, and swarm center location during foraging.

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Keywords
Artificial potentials, differential game, Hamilton-Jacobi, multiagent systems, Nash equilibrium, Ant colony optimization, Game theory, Multi agent systems, Artificial potentials, Differential games, Hamilton-Jacobi, Nash equilibria, Telecommunication networks, Computer Simulation, Cybernetics, Game Theory, Models, Biological
Citation
Published Version (Please cite this version)