Foraging swarms as Nash equilibria of dynamic games
Date
2014
Authors
Özgüler, A. B.
Yildiz, A.
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Abstract
The question of whether foraging swarms can form as a result of a noncooperative game played by individuals is shown here to have an affirmative answer. A dynamic game played by N agents in 1-D motion is introduced and models, for instance, a foraging ant colony. Each agent controls its velocity to minimize its total work done in a finite time interval. The game is shown to have a unique Nash equilibrium under two different foraging location specifications, and both equilibria display many features of a foraging swarm behavior observed in biological swarms. Explicit expressions are derived for pairwise distances between individuals of the swarm, swarm size, and swarm center location during foraging.
Source Title
IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics
Publisher
IEEE
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Keywords
Artificial potentials, differential game, Hamilton-Jacobi, multiagent systems, Nash equilibrium, Ant colony optimization, Game theory, Multi agent systems, Artificial potentials, Differential games, Hamilton-Jacobi, Nash equilibria, Telecommunication networks, Computer Simulation, Cybernetics, Game Theory, Models, Biological
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English