Retail location competition under carbon penalty

Simple item page
buir.advisorNadar, Emre
dc.contributor.authorDilek, Hande
dc.date.accessioned2016-04-21T06:37:00Z
dc.date.available2016-04-21T06:37:00Z
dc.date.copyright2016-03
dc.date.issued2016-03
dc.date.submitted14-04-2016
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of thesis.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (leaves 72-76).en_US
dc.descriptionThesis (M.S.): Bilkent University, Department of Industrial Engineering, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, 2016.en_US
dc.description.abstractThis thesis examines the retail location problem on a Hotelling line in two di erent settings: a decentralized system in which two competing retailers simultaneously choose the locations of their own stores, and a centralized system in which a single retail chain chooses the locations of its two stores. In both settings, the stores procure their products from a common warehouse and each consumer purchases from the closest store. The retailers in the decentralized system want to maximize their individual pro ts determined by the sales revenue minus the transportation costs for replenishment and consumer travels. The retail chain in the centralized system wants to maximize the sum of the two individual pro ts. Transportation costs depend on not only fuel consumption but also carbon emission. In the decentralized system, we establish that both retailers choose the same location in equilibrium in high margin markets. Numerical experiments provide further insights into the location problem: The retail chain chooses di erent locations for its stores at optimality in all instances. However, under low transportation costs, the retailers in the decentralized system choose the same location in equilibrium. As the consumer transportation costs increase, the stores are located further away from each other towards their respective consumer segments, converging to the centralized solution. Carbon penalty is more e ective for consumer travels than for replenishment in reducing excess emissions due to competition.en_US
dc.description.provenanceSubmitted by Betül Özen (ozen@bilkent.edu.tr) on 2016-04-21T06:37:00Z No. of bitstreams: 1 10106988.pdf: 1273021 bytes, checksum: 31bcaade6d1f5cbf412e9cc766546732 (MD5)en
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2016-04-21T06:37:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 10106988.pdf: 1273021 bytes, checksum: 31bcaade6d1f5cbf412e9cc766546732 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03en
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Hande Dilek.en_US
dc.format.extentxii, 124 leaves : charts.en_US
dc.identifier.itemidB153085
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/28952
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectRetail locationen_US
dc.subjectSimultaneous gameen_US
dc.subjectTransportationen_US
dc.subjectCarbon emissionsen_US
dc.subjectCarbon penaltyen_US
dc.titleRetail location competition under carbon penaltyen_US
dc.title.alternativeKarbon cezası altında rekabetçi konumlandırmaen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineIndustrial Engineering
thesis.degree.grantorBilkent University
thesis.degree.levelMaster's
thesis.degree.nameMS (Master of Science)

Files

Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
10106988.pdf
Size:
1.21 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
Full printable version
Download
License bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
license.txt
Size:
1.71 KB
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Description:
Download

Collections

Graduate School of Engineering and Science