Hypothesis testing under subjective priors and costs as a signaling game

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buir.contributor.authorGezici, Sinan
buir.contributor.authorGezici, Sinan
dc.citation.epage5183en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber19en_US
dc.citation.spage5169en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber67en_US
dc.contributor.authorSarıtaş, S.
dc.contributor.authorGezici, Sinan
dc.contributor.authorYüksel, S.
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-16T07:25:21Z
dc.date.available2021-03-16T07:25:21Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.departmentDepartment of Electrical and Electronics Engineeringen_US
dc.description.abstractMany communication, sensor network, and networked control problems involve agents (decision makers) which have either misaligned objective functions or subjective probabilistic models. In the context of such setups, we consider binary signaling problems in which the decision makers (the transmitter and the receiver) have subjective priors and/or misaligned objective functions. Depending on the commitment nature of the transmitter to his policies, we formulate the binary signaling problem as a Bayesian game under either Nash or Stackelberg equilibrium concepts and establish equilibrium solutions and their properties. We show that there can be informative or non-informative equilibria in the binary signaling game under the Stackelberg and Nash assumptions, and derive the conditions under which an informative equilibrium exists for the Stackelberg and Nash setups. For the corresponding team setup, however, an equilibrium typically always exists and is always informative. Furthermore, we investigate the effects of small perturbations in priors and costs on equilibrium values around the team setup (with identical costs and priors), and show that the Stackelberg equilibrium behavior is not robust to small perturbations whereas the Nash equilibrium is.en_US
dc.description.provenanceSubmitted by Onur Emek (onur.emek@bilkent.edu.tr) on 2021-03-16T07:25:21Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Hypothesis_Testing_Under_Subjective_Priors_and_Costs_as_a_Signaling_Game.pdf: 891968 bytes, checksum: 715af8f2319c5e40d34a42365c337356 (MD5)en
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2021-03-16T07:25:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Hypothesis_Testing_Under_Subjective_Priors_and_Costs_as_a_Signaling_Game.pdf: 891968 bytes, checksum: 715af8f2319c5e40d34a42365c337356 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019en
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/TSP.2019.2935908en_US
dc.identifier.issn1053-587X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/75933
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherIEEEen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TSP.2019.2935908en_US
dc.source.titleIEEE Transactions on Signal Processingen_US
dc.subjectSignal detectionen_US
dc.subjectHypothesis testingen_US
dc.subjectSignaling gamesen_US
dc.subjectNash equilibriumen_US
dc.subjectStackelberg equilibriumen_US
dc.subjectSubjective priorsen_US
dc.titleHypothesis testing under subjective priors and costs as a signaling gameen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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