Nash equilibria for exchangeable team against team games and their mean field limit

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buir.contributor.authorSaldı, Naci
buir.contributor.orcidSaldı, Naci|0000-0002-2677-7366
dc.citation.epage1109en_US
dc.citation.spage1104
dc.contributor.authorSanjari, S.
dc.contributor.authorSaldı, Naci
dc.contributor.authorYüksel, S.
dc.coverage.spatialSan Diego, CA, USA
dc.date.accessioned2024-03-08T11:48:56Z
dc.date.available2024-03-08T11:48:56Z
dc.date.issued2023-07-03
dc.departmentDepartment of Mathematics
dc.descriptionConference Name: 2023 American Control Conference (ACC)
dc.descriptionDate of Conference: 31 May 2023 - 02 June 2023
dc.description.abstractWe study stochastic mean-field games among finite number of teams each with large finite as well as infinite numbers of decision makers (DMs). We establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium (NE) and show that a NE exhibits exchangeability in the finite DM regime and symmetry in the infinite one. We establish the existence of a randomized NE that is exchangeable (not necessarily symmetric) among DMs within each team for a general class of exchangeable stochastic games. As the number of DMs within each team drives to infinity that is for the mean-field games among teams), using a de Finetti representation theorem, we establish the existence of a randomized NE that is symmetric (i.e., identical) among DMs within each team and also independently randomized. Finally, we establish that a NE for a class of mean-field games among teams (which is symmetric) constitutes an approximate NE for the corresponding pre-limit game among teams with mean-field interaction and large but finite number of DMs.
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2024-03-08T11:48:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Nash_equilibria_for_exchangeable_team_against_team_games_and_their_mean_field_limit.pdf: 320853 bytes, checksum: 61772ed7a3ec6b4c3a64bf98c831603e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2023-07-03en
dc.identifier.doi10.23919/ACC55779.2023.10156197
dc.identifier.eissn2378-5861
dc.identifier.isbn979-8-3503-2806-6
dc.identifier.isbn979-8-3503-2807-3
dc.identifier.isbn978-1-6654-6952-4
dc.identifier.issn0743-1619
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11693/114413
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherIEEE
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://dx.doi.org/10.23919/ACC55779.2023.10156197
dc.source.title2023 American Control Conference (ACC)
dc.subjectGames
dc.subjectNash equilibrium
dc.titleNash equilibria for exchangeable team against team games and their mean field limit
dc.typeConference Paper

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