Bargaining in institutionalized settings: the case of Turkish reforms

Date

2010

Authors

Sarigil, Z.

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Abstract

By analyzing the case of a bargaining situation in an institutionalized setting, which derives from Turkey's reform process in a sensitive issue area (civil-military relations), this study assesses the explanatory power of competing models of bargaining: rational, normative, and discursive/argumentative. The bargaining outcome in this case was puzzling because despite the existence of a strongly pro-status quo veto player (i.e. the military), the bargaining processes led to a new status quo.This study shows that the veto player simply failed to prevent a shift to a new status quo because such an action would do substantial damage to the military's ideational concerns (normative entrapment). The rational model remains under-socialized, while the discursive model is over-socialized in analyzing this bargaining situation. Although the normative model sheds more light on this puzzling outcome, a synthesis between normative and rational models would provide us with much better insight. © The Author(s) 2010.

Source Title

European Journal of International Relations

Publisher

Sage Publications Ltd.

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Published Version (Please cite this version)

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English