On the number of bins in equilibria for signaling games

Simple item page
buir.contributor.authorSarıtaş, Serkan
buir.contributor.authorYüksel, Serdar
buir.contributor.authorGezici, Sinan
dc.citation.epage976en_US
dc.citation.spage972en_US
dc.contributor.authorSarıtaş, Serkanen_US
dc.contributor.authorYüksel, Serdaren_US
dc.contributor.authorGezici, Sinanen_US
dc.coverage.spatialParis, Franceen_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-29T13:48:57Z
dc.date.available2020-01-29T13:48:57Z
dc.date.issued2019-07
dc.departmentDepartment of Computer Engineeringen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Electrical and Electronics Engineeringen_US
dc.descriptionDate of Conference: 7-12 July 2019en_US
dc.descriptionConference name: 2019 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)en_US
dc.description.abstractWe investigate the equilibrium behavior for the decentralized quadratic cheap talk problem in which an encoder and a decoder, viewed as two decision makers, have misaligned objective functions. In prior work, we have shown that the number of bins under any equilibrium has to be at most countable, generalizing a classical result due to Crawford and Sobel who considered sources with density supported on [0, 1]. In this paper, we refine this result in the context of exponential and Gaussian sources. For exponential sources, a relation between the upper bound on the number of bins and the misalignment in the objective functions is derived, the equilibrium costs are compared, and it is shown that there also exist equilibria with infinitely many bins under certain parametric assumptions. For Gaussian sources, it is shown that there exist equilibria with infinitely many bins.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/ISIT.2019.8849498en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/52911
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherIEEEen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1109/ISIT.2019.8849498en_US
dc.source.title2019 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)en_US
dc.subjectDecodingen_US
dc.subjectGamesen_US
dc.subjectUpper bounden_US
dc.subjectQuantization (signal)en_US
dc.subjectManganeseen_US
dc.subjectLinear programmingen_US
dc.subjectCost functionen_US
dc.titleOn the number of bins in equilibria for signaling gamesen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US

Files

Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
On_the_Number_of_Bins_in_Equilibria_for_Signaling_Games.pdf
Size:
261.77 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
Download

Collections

Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering
Department of Computer Engineering