Collective action and the peculiar evil of genocide

dc.citation.epage392en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber3-4en_US
dc.citation.spage376en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber37en_US
dc.contributor.authorWringe, B.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T10:16:48Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T10:16:48Z
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.description.abstractThere is a common intuition that genocide is qualitatively distinct from, and much worse than, mass murder. If we concentrate on the most obvious differences between genocidal killing and other cases of mass murder it is difficult to see why this should be the case. I argue that many cases of genocide involve not merely individual evil but a form of collective action manifesting a collective evil will. It is this that explains the moral distinctiveness of genocide. My view contrasts with one put forward by Claudia Card, though we both agree that the notion of ‘‘social death’’ plays a significant role here.en_US
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2016-02-08T10:16:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 bilkent-research-paper.pdf: 70227 bytes, checksum: 26e812c6f5156f83f0e77b261a471b5a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006en
dc.identifier.issn0026-1068
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/23640
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.source.titleMetaphilosophyen_US
dc.subjectCollective actionen_US
dc.subjectEvilen_US
dc.subjectGenocideen_US
dc.titleCollective action and the peculiar evil of genocideen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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