Computationalism: Still the only game in town-A reply to Swiatczak's "Conscious representations: An intractable problem for the computational theory of mind"

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dc.citation.epage190en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber3en_US
dc.citation.spage183en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber22en_US
dc.contributor.authorDavenport, D.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-28T12:04:28Z
dc.date.available2015-07-28T12:04:28Z
dc.date.issued2012-02-18en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Computer Engineeringen_US
dc.description.abstractMental representations, Swiatczak (Minds Mach 21:19-32, 2011) argues, are fundamentally biochemical and their operations depend on consciousness; hence the computational theory of mind, based as it is on multiple realisability and purely syntactic operations, must be wrong. Swiatczak, however, is mistaken. Computation, properly understood, can afford descriptions/explanations of any physical process, and since Swiatczak accepts that consciousness has a physical basis, his argument against computationalism must fail. Of course, we may not have much idea how consciousness (itself a rather unclear plurality of notions) might be implemented, but we do have a hypothesis-that all of our mental life, including consciousness, is the result of computational processes and so not tied to a biochemical substrate. Like it or not, the computational theory of mind remains the only game in town. © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011.en_US
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2015-07-28T12:04:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 10.1007-s11023-012-9271-5.pdf: 138950 bytes, checksum: fbf6bdf269a4518c703cc8f62102a112 (MD5)en
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11023-012-9271-5en_US
dc.identifier.eissn1572-8641
dc.identifier.issn0924-6495
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/13045
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherSpringer Netherlandsen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11023-012-9271-5en_US
dc.source.titleMinds and Machines: journal for artificial intelligence, philosophy and cognitive sciencesen_US
dc.subjectComputational theory of minden_US
dc.subjectComputationalismen_US
dc.subjectConsciousnessen_US
dc.subjectComputationen_US
dc.subjectMental representationen_US
dc.titleComputationalism: Still the only game in town-A reply to Swiatczak's "Conscious representations: An intractable problem for the computational theory of mind"en_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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