Stochastic control approach to reputation games

Simple item page
buir.contributor.authorNuh Aygün, Dalkıran
dc.citation.epage4725en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber11en_US
dc.citation.spage4710en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber65en_US
dc.contributor.authorNuh Aygün, Dalkıran
dc.contributor.authorYüksel, S.
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-18T08:57:42Z
dc.date.available2021-02-18T08:57:42Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractThrough a stochastic-control-theoretic approach, we analyze reputation games, where a strategic long-lived player acts in a sequential repeated game against a collection of short-lived players. The key assumption in our model is that the information of the short-lived players is nested in that of the long-lived player. This nested information structure is obtained through an appropriate monitoring structure. Under this monitoring structure, we show that, given mild assumptions, the set of perfect Bayesian equilibrium payoffs coincides with Markov perfect equilibrium payoffs, and hence, a dynamic programming formulation can be obtained for the computation of equilibrium strategies of the strategic long-lived player in the discounted setup. We also consider the undiscounted average-payoff setup, where we obtain an optimal equilibrium strategy of the strategic long-lived player under further technical conditions. We then use this optimal strategy in the undiscounted setup as a tool to obtain a tight upper payoff bound for the arbitrarily patient long-lived player in the discounted setup. Finally, by using measure concentration techniques, we obtain a refined lower payoff bound on the value of reputation in the discounted setup. We also study the continuity of equilibrium payoffs in the prior beliefs.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipThis work was supported in part by the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey and in part by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canadaen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/TAC.2020.2968861en_US
dc.identifier.issn0018-9286
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/75436
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherIEEEen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TAC.2020.2968861en_US
dc.source.titleIEEE Transactions on Automatic Controlen_US
dc.subjectGame theoryen_US
dc.subjectRepeated gamesen_US
dc.subjectIncomplete informationen_US
dc.subjectSignaling gamesen_US
dc.titleStochastic control approach to reputation gamesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

Files

Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
Stochastic_Control_Approach_to_Reputation_Games.pdf
Size:
612.79 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
Download
License bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
license.txt
Size:
1.71 KB
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Description:
Download

Collections

Department of Economics