Speculation and the decision to abandon a fixed exchange rate regime

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dc.citation.epage229en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber1en_US
dc.citation.spage197en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber57en_US
dc.contributor.authorPastine, I.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T10:32:56Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T10:32:56Z
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper demonstrates that the implications of first-generation speculative attack models do not hold if there is a rational, forward-looking policy maker. The policy maker will be able to avoid predictable speculative attacks by introducing uncertainty into the decisions of speculators. This changes the sudden attack into a prolonged period of increasing speculation and uncertainty. In addition, the model provides useful insights into the viability of temporary nominal anchor policies, and a theoretical foundation for a useful empirical methodology. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0022-1996(01)00134-9en_US
dc.identifier.eissn1873-0353
dc.identifier.issn0022-1996
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/24688
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherElsevier BVen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1996(01)00134-9en_US
dc.source.titleJournal of International Economicsen_US
dc.subjectNominal anchoren_US
dc.subjectOptimizing BOP crisesen_US
dc.subjectSpeculative attacksen_US
dc.subjectExchange rateen_US
dc.subjectModelen_US
dc.subjectMonetary policyen_US
dc.subjectPolicy makingen_US
dc.titleSpeculation and the decision to abandon a fixed exchange rate regimeen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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