Quadratic privacy-signaling games and the MMSE ınformation bottleneck problem for gaussian sources
We investigate a privacy-signaling game problem in which a sender with privacy concerns observes a pair of correlated random vectors which are modeled as jointly Gaussian. The sender aims to hide one of these random vectors and convey the other one whereas the objective of the receiver is to accurately estimate both of the random vectors. We analyze these conflicting objectives in a game theoretic framework with quadratic costs where depending on the commitment conditions (of the sender), we consider Nash or Stackelberg (Bayesian persuasion) equilibria. We show that a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium among all admissible policies is attained by a set of explicitly characterized linear policies. We also show that a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium coincides with a Stackelberg equilibrium. We formulate the information bottleneck problem within our Stackelberg framework under the mean squared error distortion criterion where the information bottleneck setup has a further restriction that only one of the random variables is observed at the sender. We show that this MMSE Gaussian Information Bottleneck Problem admits a linear solution which is explicitly characterized in the paper. We provide explicit conditions on when the optimal solutions, or equilibrium solutions in the Nash setup, are informative or noninformative.