Intermediaries and corruption
Date
2008
Authors
Hasker, K.
Okten, C.
Editor(s)
Advisor
Supervisor
Co-Advisor
Co-Supervisor
Instructor
Source Title
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Print ISSN
0167-2681
Electronic ISSN
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Volume
67
Issue
1
Pages
103 - 115
Language
English
Type
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Series
Abstract
Surveys of businessmen and anecdotal evidence blame intermediary agents (middlemen hired by corporations and individuals) for increasing corruption in the developing world. Although this problem has gained the attention of policy makers, there has been little formal analysis of it in the economics literature. In a game theoretic model analyzing the interaction between clients, public official and intermediary agents, we find that intermediary agents worsen the impact of corruption and that traditional methods of fighting corruption can actually increase corruption in the presence of intermediary agents. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.