Central bank independence, government political orientation and optimum government expenditure financing

buir.contributor.authorBerument, Hakan
dc.citation.epage461en_US
dc.citation.spage433en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber4en_US
dc.contributor.authorBerument, Hakanen_US
dc.contributor.authorÖnder, A. Ö.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-13T20:05:32Z
dc.date.available2019-02-13T20:05:32Z
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper extends the government optimum expenditure financing model by incorporating the effects of both the government's political orientation and the central bank's independence. For the panel data of fourteen OECD countries for the period from 1974 to 1997, this paper shows first that countries with higher levels of central bank independence generate less seigniorage revenue, and second that governments which are controlled by left-wing parties create more seigniorage revenue to finance their spending.en_US
dc.identifier.eissn1467-9396
dc.identifier.issn0965-7576
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/49491
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherWiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.en_US
dc.source.titleReview of International Economics and Businessen_US
dc.subjectGovernment optimum expenditure financing modelen_US
dc.subjectCentral bank independenceen_US
dc.subjectPartisan theoryen_US
dc.titleCentral bank independence, government political orientation and optimum government expenditure financingen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
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