Opinion dynamics of stubborn agents under the presence of a troll as differential game

Simple item page
buir.contributor.authorÖzgüler, Arif Bülent
buir.contributor.orcidÖzgüler, Arif Bülent|0000-0002-2173-333X
dc.citation.epage3269en_US
dc.citation.spage3259en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber29en_US
dc.contributor.authorYıldız, A.
dc.contributor.authorÖzgüler, Arif Bülent
dc.date.accessioned2022-03-01T08:32:04Z
dc.date.available2022-03-01T08:32:04Z
dc.date.issued2021-11-30
dc.departmentDepartment of Electrical and Electronics Engineeringen_US
dc.description.abstractThe question of whether opinions of stubborn agents result in Nash equilibrium under the presence of troll is investigated in this study. The opinion dynamics is modelled as a differential game played by n agents during a finite time horizon. Two types of agents, ordinary agents and troll, are considered in this game. Troll is treated as a malicious stubborn content maker who disagrees with every other agent. On the other hand, ordinary agents maintain cooperative communication with other ordinary agents and they disagree with the troll. Under this scenario, explicit expressions of opinion trajectories are obtained by applying Pontryagin’s principle on the cost function. This approach provides insight into the social networks that comprise a troll in addition to ordinary agentsen_US
dc.description.provenanceSubmitted by Dilan Ayverdi (dilan.ayverdi@bilkent.edu.tr) on 2022-03-01T08:32:04Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Opinion_dynamics_of_stubborn_agents_under_the_presence_of_a_troll_as_differential_game.pdf: 5541828 bytes, checksum: 612ba1cd1ad274406d21f349ead4c8b5 (MD5)en
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2022-03-01T08:32:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Opinion_dynamics_of_stubborn_agents_under_the_presence_of_a_troll_as_differential_game.pdf: 5541828 bytes, checksum: 612ba1cd1ad274406d21f349ead4c8b5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2021-11-30en
dc.identifier.doi10.3906/elk-2004-50en_US
dc.identifier.eissn1303-6203
dc.identifier.issn1300-0632
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/77642
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherScientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey - TUBITAK,Turkiye Bilimsel ve Teknik Arastirma Kurumuen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.3906/elk-2004-50en_US
dc.source.titleTurkish Journal of Electrical Engineering & Computer Sciencesen_US
dc.subjectOpinion dynamicsen_US
dc.subjectSocial networken_US
dc.subjectDifferential gameen_US
dc.subjectNash equilibriumen_US
dc.subjectPontryagin’s principleen_US
dc.subjectTrollen_US
dc.titleOpinion dynamics of stubborn agents under the presence of a troll as differential gameen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

Files

Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
Opinion_dynamics_of_stubborn_agents_under_the_presence_of_a_troll_as_differential_game.pdf
Size:
5.29 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
Download
License bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
license.txt
Size:
1.69 KB
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Description:
Download

Collections

Scholarly Publications - Electrical and Electronics Engineering