Binary signaling under subjective priors and costs as a game

Simple item page
buir.contributor.authorGezici, Sinan
dc.citation.epage1135en_US
dc.citation.spage1130en_US
dc.contributor.authorSarıtaş, S.en_US
dc.contributor.authorGezici, Sinanen_US
dc.contributor.authorYüksel, S.en_US
dc.contributor.editorTeel, A. R.
dc.contributor.editorEgerstedt, M.
dc.coverage.spatialMiami Beach, Florida, USAen_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-27T12:59:40Zen_US
dc.date.available2020-01-27T12:59:40Zen_US
dc.date.issued2019en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Electrical and Electronics Engineeringen_US
dc.descriptionDate of Conference: 17-19 December 2018en_US
dc.descriptionConference Name: 57th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2018en_US
dc.description.abstractMany decentralized and networked control problems involve decision makers which have either misaligned criteria or subjective priors. In the context of such a setup, in this paper we consider binary signaling problems in which the decision makers (the transmitter and the receiver) have subjective priors and/or misaligned objective functions. Depending on the commitment nature of the transmitter to his policies, we formulate the binary signaling problem as a Bayesian game under either Nash or Stackelberg equilibrium concepts and establish equilibrium solutions and their properties. In addition, the effects of subjective priors and costs on Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are analyzed. It is shown that there can be informative or non-informative equilibria in the binary signaling game under the Stackelberg assumption, but there always exists an equilibrium. However, apart from the informative and non-informative equilibria cases, under certain conditions, there does not exist a Nash equilibrium when the receiver is restricted to use deterministic policies. For the corresponding team setup, however, an equilibrium typically always exists and is always informative. Furthermore, we investigate the effects of small perturbations in priors and costs on equilibrium values around the team setup (with identical costs and priors), and show that the Stackelberg equilibrium behavior is not robust to small perturbations whereas the Nash equilibrium is.en_US
dc.description.provenanceSubmitted by Zeynep Aykut (zeynepay@bilkent.edu.tr) on 2020-01-27T12:59:40Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Binary_signaling_under_subjective_priors_and_costs_as_a_game.pdf: 613126 bytes, checksum: 9e53771d2f217255fbf4f570c343fe31 (MD5)en
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2020-01-27T12:59:40Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Binary_signaling_under_subjective_priors_and_costs_as_a_game.pdf: 613126 bytes, checksum: 9e53771d2f217255fbf4f570c343fe31 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019en
dc.description.sponsorshipMathWorksen_US
dc.description.sponsorshipMitsubishi Electric Research Laboratories (MERL)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipSkydioen_US
dc.description.sponsorshipSociety for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM)en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipUnited Technologies Research Center (UTRC)en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1109/CDC.2018.8619612en_US
dc.identifier.eisbn9781538613955en_US
dc.identifier.eissn2576-2370en_US
dc.identifier.isbn9781538613962en_US
dc.identifier.issn0743-1546en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/52843en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.en_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2018.8619612en_US
dc.source.titleProceedings of the 57th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2018en_US
dc.subjectTransmittersen_US
dc.subjectReceiversen_US
dc.subjectGamesen_US
dc.subjectNash equilibriumen_US
dc.subjectDecodingen_US
dc.subjectPerturbation methodsen_US
dc.titleBinary signaling under subjective priors and costs as a gameen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US

Files

Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
Binary_signaling_under_subjective_priors_and_costs_as_a_game.pdf
Size:
598.76 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
View / Download
Download
License bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
license.txt
Size:
1.71 KB
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Description:
Download

Collections

Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering