Cryptographic solutions for credibility and liability issues of genomic data
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Abstract
In this work, we consider a scenario that includes an individual sharing his genomic data (or results obtained from his genomic data) with a service provider. In this scenario, (i) the service provider wants to make sure that received genomic data (or results) in fact belongs to the corresponding individual (and computed correctly), (ii) the individual wants to provide a digital consent along with his data specifying whether the service provider is allowed to further share his data, and (iii) if his data is shared without his consent, the individual wants to determine the service provider that is responsible for this leakage. We propose two schemes based on homomorphic signature and aggregate signature that links the information about the legitimacy of the data to the consent and the phenotype of the individual. Thus, to verify the data, each party also needs to use the correct consent and phenotype of the individual who owns the data.