A bilevel uncapacitated location/pricing problem with Hotelling access costs in one-dimensional space
Date
2016
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Information Systems, Logistics, and Supply Chain
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International Conference on Information Systems, Logistics and Supply Chain
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English
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Conference Paper
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Abstract
We formulate a spatial pricing problem as bilevel non-capacitated location: a leader first decides which facilities to open and sets service prices taking competing offers into account; then, customers make individual decisions minimizing individual costs that include access charges in the spirit of Hotelling. Both leader and customers are assumed to be risk-neutral. For non-metric costs (i.e., when access costs do not satisfy the triangle inequality), the problem is NP-hard even if facilities can be opened at no fixed cost. We describe an algorithm for solving the Euclidean 1-dimensional case (i.e., with access cost defined by the Euclidean norm on a line) with fixed opening costs and a single competing facility.
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Bilevel programming, Facility location, Stackelberg games, Information systems, Location, Risk perception, Supply chains, Algorithm for solving, Bi-level programming, Capacitated location, Euclidean norm, Facility locations, Pricing problems, Stackelberg Games, Triangle inequality, Costs