Generalized second price auction is optimal for discrete types

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dc.citation.epage38en_US
dc.citation.spage35en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber141en_US
dc.contributor.authorBayrak, H. I.en_US
dc.contributor.authorPınar, M. Ç.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-12T10:55:23Z
dc.date.available2018-04-12T10:55:23Z
dc.date.issued2016en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Industrial Engineeringen_US
dc.description.abstractWe prove that a variant of the second price auction for the sale of a single good through a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism that maximizes expected revenue of the seller is optimal when the type space is discrete. Moreover, we show that this variant is related to the widely used generalized second price auction mechanism in keyword-auctions for advertising, thus providing a theoretical justification for a practical tool.en_US
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2018-04-12T10:55:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 bilkent-research-paper.pdf: 179475 bytes, checksum: ea0bedeb05ac9ccfb983c327e155f0c2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016en
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.019en_US
dc.identifier.eissn1873-7374
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/36848
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.019en_US
dc.source.titleEconomics Lettersen_US
dc.subjectImplementationen_US
dc.subjectLinear programmingen_US
dc.subjectOnline advertisingen_US
dc.subjectOptimal auction designen_US
dc.subjectSecond price auction with reserveen_US
dc.subjectSubmodular functionsen_US
dc.titleGeneralized second price auction is optimal for discrete typesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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