Swarming behavior as Nash equilibrium
Date
2012-09
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Abstract
The question of whether swarms can form as a result of a non-cooperative game played by individuals is shown here to have an affirmative answer. A dynamic game played by N agents in one-dimensional motion is introduced and models, for instance, a foraging ant colony. Each agent controls its velocity to minimize its total work done in a finite time interval. The game is shown to have a Nash equilibrium that has all the features of a swarm behavior. © 2012 IFAC.
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Proceedings of the 3rd IFAC Workshop on Distributed Estimation and Control in Networked Systems
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Elsevier
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English