Retail location competition under carbon penalty

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buir.contributor.authorNadar, Emre
dc.citation.epage158en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber1en_US
dc.citation.spage146en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber269en_US
dc.contributor.authorDilek, H.en_US
dc.contributor.authorKaraer, Ö.en_US
dc.contributor.authorNadar, Emreen_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-21T16:01:32Z
dc.date.available2019-02-21T16:01:32Z
dc.date.issued2018en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Industrial Engineeringen_US
dc.description.abstractWe study the retail location problem in a competitive linear market in which two retailers simultaneously choose their locations. Both retailers procure identical products from a common supplier and each consumer purchases from the closest retailer. Each retailer incurs transportation costs for inventory replenishment from the warehouse and consumer travels to the store. We consider two carbon tax schemes imposed on retailers: for supply-chain-related transportation and for consumer-related transportation. Our analysis indicates that intense competition between retailers leads to a “minimal differentiation” equilibrium, which substantially increases the total system emissions. According to our numerical experiments with realistic parameter values, carbon tax on supply-chain-related transportation does not affect retail location decisions. Carbon tax on consumer transportation, however, may effectively induce the retailers to approach the middle of their respective markets, reducing the total system emissions. Our analysis also indicates that a low carbon price, relative to market profitability, only reduces the total system profit without any effect on emissions. Our findings suggest that the central policymaker avoid a uniform carbon price across different sources of emission and sectors with different characteristics.
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2019-02-21T16:01:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Bilkent-research-paper.pdf: 222869 bytes, checksum: 842af2b9bd649e7f548593affdbafbb3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018en
dc.embargo.release2020-08-16en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.ejor.2017.10.060
dc.identifier.issn0377-2217
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/49869
dc.language.isoEnglish
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.10.060
dc.source.titleEuropean Journal of Operational Researchen_US
dc.subjectCarbon penaltyen_US
dc.subjectCompetitionen_US
dc.subjectGame theoryen_US
dc.subjectOR in environment and climate changeen_US
dc.subjectRetail locationen_US
dc.titleRetail location competition under carbon penaltyen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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