Browsing by Subject "Yugoslavia War, 1991-1995--Bosnia and Hercegovina."

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Open Access
Analysing negotiated outcomes : the Dayton Peace Agreement
(1997) Demirel, Tijen Tanja
This study aims to analyse the negotiated outcomes of the Dayton Peace Agreement. For this purpose, the study examines three main issues of the agreement, namely the territorial issue, the constitutional issue and the issue of Sarajevo, in terms of their distributive and integrative aspects. The territorial issue has five and the constitutional issue has three sub-issues. In cases where integrative agreements are reached, the study examines the type of the mechanisms to reach integrative outcomes. These mechanisms are expanding the pie, nonspecific compensation, logrolling, cost cutting and bridging. According to the analyses of these negotiated outcomes, this thesis reveals that among eight sub-issues and one main issue, the negotiated outcomes of five sub-issues and the one main issue are integrative. The theoretical, methodological and practical implications of the findings of the analyses are further elaborated in this study.
Open Access
The US and the Bosnian war : an analytical survey on the formulation of US policy from the Yugoslav dissolution to the Dayton Accords, 1991-1995
(1997) Eryılmaz, Dilek
Yugoslavia’s collapse in the early 1990s was the first European post cold-war challenge for the West, the EU and the US, to meet. However, it is clear that, following from a slow and flawed start, the US did not provide the required leadership to which Europe had been accustomed though it occasionally came up with meaningful policy options to stop the genocidal war in Bosnia, while the Europeans looked all-too-willing to accept the ‘facts on the ground’. During the course of the three-and-half year long war, which claimed about two hundred thousands of lives, the US-EU split became quite visible, and at various times, it looked to many as if the US had changed its traditional policy of leadership for a much more reduced role in crises management on European soil, an assumption boastfully confirmed by the Europeans until the US came back to the scene in 1995. The return of the US with long-sought leadership and resources put an end to the carnage in Bosnia and brought about the Dayton Accords. At the same time, it underlined the fact that the EU is unable to put things in order on its own continent, and that the US’ traditional role is bound to continue in Europe. The dissertation is a short survey of the US’ initial flawed diagnosis of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and then of Bosnia, the wrangling between the US and the EU which became more and more visible in the course of 1993 and 1994 and finally the US’ policy of knocking heads together to achieve the Dayton Accords.