Browsing by Subject "Value of information"
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Item Open Access Information and preference reversals in lotteries(Elsevier, 2011) Bakır, N. O.; Klutke, G-A.Several approaches have been proposed for evaluating information in expected utility theory. Among the most popular approaches are the expected utility increase, the selling price and the buying price. While the expected utility increase and the selling price always agree in ranking information alternatives, Hazen and Sounderpandian [11] have demonstrated that the buying price may not always agree with the other two. That is, in some cases, where the expected utility increase would value information A more highly than information B, the buying price may reverse these preferences. In this paper, we discuss the conditions under which all these approaches agree in a generic decision environment where the decision maker may choose to acquire arbitrary information bundles.Item Open Access Receding horizon control of mixed line flow shop systems(2011) Gokbayrak, K.We consider reliable mixed line flow shop systems that are composed of controllable and uncontrollable machines. These systems are assumed to receive arrivals at random instants and process jobs deterministically in the order of arrival so as to depart them before their deadlines that are revealed at the time of arrival. We model these flow shops as serial networks of queues operating under a non-preemptive first-come-first-served policy. Defining completion-time costs for jobs and process costs at controllable machines, a stochastic convex optimization problem is formulated where the control variables are the constrained service times of jobs at the controllable machines. As an on-line solution method to determine these service times, we propose a receding horizon controller, which solves a deterministic problem at each decision instant. We quantify the available future information by the look-ahead window size. Numerical examples demonstrate the value of information and that the no-waiting property of the full-information case is not observed in the partial-information case.Item Open Access Value of supplier's capacity information in a two-echelon supply chain(2011) Bakal, İ. S.; Erkip, N.; Güllü, R.In traditional supply chain models it is generally assumed that full information is available to all parties involved. Although this seems reasonable, there are cases where chain members are independent agents and possess different levels of information. In this study, we analyze a two-echelon, single supplier-multiple retailers supply chain in a single-period setting where the capacity of the supplier is limited. Embedding the lack of information about the capacity of the supplier in the model, we aim to analyze the reaction of the retailers, compare it with the full-information case, and assess the value of information and the effects of information asymmetry using game theoretic analysis. In our numerical studies, we conclude that the value of information is highly dependent on the capacity conditions and estimates of the retailers, and having information is not necessarily beneficial to the retailers.