Browsing by Subject "Solution concepts"

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Open Access
Duality, area-considerations, and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution
(Elsevier, 2017) Karagözoğlu, E.; Rachmilevitch, S.
We introduce a new solution concept for 2-person bargaining problems, which can be considered as the dual of the Equal-Area solution (EA) (see Anbarcı and Bigelow (1994)). Hence, we call it the Dual Equal-Area solution (DEA). We show that the point selected by the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution (see Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975)) lies in between those that are selected by EA and DEA. We formulate an axiom–area-based fairness–and offer three characterizations of the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution in which this axiom plays a central role. © 2016 Elsevier B.V.
Open Access
Dynamic signaling games under Nash and Stackelberg equilibria
(IEEE, 2016) Sarıtaş, Serkan; Yüksel, Serdar; Gezici, Sinan
In this study, dynamic and repeated quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems are investigated. These involve encoder and decoders with mismatched performance objectives, where the encoder has a bias term in the quadratic cost functional. We consider both Nash equilibria and Stackelberg equilibria as our solution concepts, under a perfect Bayesian formulation. These two lead to drastically different characteristics for the equilibria. For the cheap talk problem under Nash equilibria, we show that fully revealing equilibria cannot exist and the final state equilibria have to be quantized for a large class of source models; whereas, for the Stackelberg case, the equilibria must be fully revealing regardless of the source model. In the dynamic signaling game where the transmission of a Gaussian source over a Gaussian channel is considered, the equilibrium policies are always linear for scalar sources under Stackelberg equilibria, and affine policies constitute an invariant subspace under best response maps for Nash equilibria.