Browsing by Subject "Social choice"

Filter results by typing the first few letters
Now showing 1 - 4 of 4
  • Thumbnail Image
    ItemRestricted
  • Thumbnail Image
    ItemOpen Access
    Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain
    (Springer, 2003) Koray, S.; Unel, B.
    Self-selectivity is a new kind of consistency pertaining to social choice rules. It deals with the problem of whether a social choice rule selects itself from among other rival such rules when a society is also to choose the choice rule that it will employ in making its choice from a given set of alternatives. Koray shows that a neutral and unanimous social choice function is universally self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial. In this paper, we confine the available social choice functions to the tops-only domain and examine whether such restriction allow us to escape the dictatoriality result. A neutral, unanimous, and tops-only social choice function, however, turns out to be self-selective relative to the tops-only domain if and only if it is top-monotonic, and thus again dictatorial.
  • Thumbnail Image
    ItemOpen Access
    Consistency
    (1998) Özgür, Onur
    In this study, we introduce a different mechanism with a hybrid ownership definition lying in between public and private ownership. Agents have claims over the endowments and the total production of the economy instead of having absolute ownership rights. We define social desirability as the following: an alternative x is socially preferred to an alternative y if the majority of the agents prefer x to y. In this context, we investigate whether the competitive equilibrium outcome is socially the most desirable outcome and whether there are other efficient outcomes socially preferred to the competitive equilibrium outcome. We use a voting scheme where agents vote on the production alternatives of the economy. We investigate if there is a voting rule that leads to the competitive equilibrium outcome and what kind of a rule this latter is. The central finding of the study is that, for a class of production and utility functions, there is a voting rule that leads to the competitive equilibrium outcome. Moreover, this is a weighted voting rule where agents’ votes are their initial claims. A second important contribution is the analysis of the process of candidate nomination, which is most of the time, neglected by social choice problems. Finally, we consider the transfer problem where agents make transfers to other agents to make them vote on specific alternatives.
  • Thumbnail Image
    ItemOpen Access
    Measuring self-selectivity via generalized Condorcet rules
    (2011) Altuntaş, Açelya
    In this thesis, we introduce a method to measure self-selectivity of social choice functions. Due to Koray [2000], a neutral and unanimous social choice function is known to be universally self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial. Therefore, in this study, we confine our set of test social choice functions to particular singleton-valued refinements of generalized Condorcet rules. We show that there are some non-dictatorial self-selective social choice functions. Moreover, we define the notion of self-selectivity degree which enables us to compare social choice functions according to the strength of their selfselectivities. We conclude that the family of generalized Condorcet functions is an appropriate set of test social choice functions when we localize the notion of self-selectivity.