Browsing by Subject "Social Welfare"
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Item Open Access Manipulation via information in large elections(2006) Sezer, İlhanThis thesis studies manipulations of equilibria by candidates in two-alternative elections along with their effects on voter turnout, winner of the election and social welfare where voters have common values, and both voting and manipulating are costly. We show that manipulation is not desirable for the society, and the candidates’ incentives for manipulating can be mitigated by appropriately sequencing the order of manipulations. We present some results of a manipulation game which may rather unexpected under the assumption that the candidates have prior beliefs about each others’ manipulations. Finally we determine the set of manipulations which can be prevented by informed voters for a given composition of society.Item Unknown Personality and culture, the social science research council, and liberal social engineering: the advisory committee on personality and culture, 1930-1934(John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2009) Dennis, B.The field of personality and culture was given a significant impetus during the 1930s with the establishment of the Advisory Committee on Personality and Culture (1930-1934) by the Social Science Research Council. This committee provided an early formulation of personality and culture that emphasized the interdisciplinary focus on the processes of personality formation within small-scale social settings. The committee's formulation also coupled personality and culture with a liberal social engineering approach geared toward cultural reconstruction. Major social scientists and clinicians were involved in the activities of the committee, including Edward Sapir, W. I. Thomas, E. W. Burgess, E. A. Bott, Robert S. Woodworth, Harry Stack Sullivan, C. M. Hincks, and Adolf Meyer.Item Unknown Stability of covers under different rights structures(2012) Akbulut, ÇiğdemA countryís social welfare depends on Örmsí proÖts and consumersí surplus. Given unions of countries, a countryís aim is to maximize its own social welfare when it decides to enter or exit a union. For examining unions, we use the notion of a cover as elaborated in Koray (2007).We utilize the Öndings of Ilk¨l¨Á · (2010) about the Cournot equilibrium in our setting to examine core stability and e¢ ciency of covers of countries.We adapt di§erent rightsístructures based on; free exit, free entry, approved exit and approved entry introduced by Sertel (1992) to the context of covers, along with introducing some stronger structures and study how stability of covers varies when linkage costs are imposed upon countries.