Browsing by Subject "Sequential equilibrium"
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Item Open Access A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power(Springer, 2000) Bac, M.Strategic delay and restricted offers are two modes of signaling bargaining power in alternating offers bargaining games. This paper shows that when both modes are available, the best signaling strategy of the "strong" type of the informed player consists of a pure strategic delay followed by an offer on the whole pie. There is no signaling motivation for issue-by-issue bargaining when the issues are perfectly substitutable.Item Open Access Signaling bargaining power: strategic delay versus restricted offers(Springer, 2000) Bac, M.I study the first-round separating equilibrium of a buyer-seller bargaining game, extended to allow for asymmetric information, strategically delayed offers and offers restricted to a portion of the good. When bargaining is over a consumption good, in equilibrium the “strong” buyer uses a restricted offer if his optimal consumption path is conservative relative to the “weak” buyer. A pure restricted offer may even be a costless, efficient signal. When the good is durable, a pure strategic delay is involved in signaling a strong bargaining position if the discount factor is high.