Browsing by Subject "Self-selectivity"
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Item Open Access Explorations of self-selective social choice functions(1999) Ünel, BülentIn this study, we analyze self-selective social choice functions focusing on whether one can escape dictatoriality. Two ways are examined: In the first attempt, the set of social choice functions is restricted to tops only. With this restriction, selfselectivity turns out to be equivalent to dictatoriality. In the second, the set of prefence profiles restricted to single-peaked ones. Here we show that there are some self-selective social choice functions which are not dictatorial.Item Open Access Measuring self-selectivity via generalized Condorcet rules(2011) Altuntaş, AçelyaIn this thesis, we introduce a method to measure self-selectivity of social choice functions. Due to Koray [2000], a neutral and unanimous social choice function is known to be universally self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial. Therefore, in this study, we confine our set of test social choice functions to particular singleton-valued refinements of generalized Condorcet rules. We show that there are some non-dictatorial self-selective social choice functions. Moreover, we define the notion of self-selectivity degree which enables us to compare social choice functions according to the strength of their selfselectivities. We conclude that the family of generalized Condorcet functions is an appropriate set of test social choice functions when we localize the notion of self-selectivity.Item Open Access Self-selective social choice functions verify arrow and gibbard-satterthwaite theorems(Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2000) Koray, S.This paper introduces a new notion of consistency for social choice functions, called self-selectivity, which requires that a social choice function employed by a society to make a choice from a given alternative set it faces should choose itself from among other rival such functions when it is employed by the society to make this latter choice as well. A unanimous neutral social choice function turns out to be universally self-selective if and only if it is Paretian and satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives. The neutral unanimous social choice functions whose domains consist of linear order profiles on nonempty sets of any finite cardinality induce a class of social welfare functions that inherit Paretianism and independence of irrelevant alternatives in case the social choice function with which one starts is universally self-selective. Thus, a unanimous and neutral social choice function is universally self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial. Moreover, universal self-selectivity for such functions is equivalent to the conjunction of strategy-proofness and independence of irrelevant alternatives or the conjunction of monotonicity and independence of irrelevant alternatives again.Item Open Access Universally selection-closed families of social choice functions(2009) Şenocak, TalatIn this thesis, we introduce a new notion of consistency for families of social choice functions, called selection-closedness. This concept requires that every member of a family of social choice functions that are to be employed by a society to make its choice from an alternative set it faces, should choose a member of the given family, when it is also employed to choose the social choice function itself in the presence of other rival such functions along with the members of the initial family. We show that a proper subset of neutral social choice functions is universally selection-closed if and only if it is a subset of the set of dictatorial and anti-dictatorial social choice functions. Finally, we introduce a weaker version of selection-closedness and conclude that a “rightextendable scoring correspondence” is strict if and only if the set consisting of its singleton valued refinements is universally weakly selection-closed.