Browsing by Subject "Partial Sales"
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Item Open Access Mergers and acquisitions during financial crises(2016-09) Yılmaz, Işıl SevilayThis thesis investigates the effects of financial crises on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity. We investigate if M&A deals in crisis periods differ in terms of dollar volume and quantity of deals, target and bidder characteristics, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and deal premiums. First, we describe global M&A activity across 47 countries over the period 1992 to 2011. We investigate how value is generated and distributed in M&A deals around the world. We find that M&A activity (particularly in deals where control rights are sold) generates value. We also find that the magnitudes of bidder and target CARs in developed countries are higher than those in emerging-market countries. Second, we identify effects of financial crises based on a sample of 39 countries. We conclude that financial crisis in target country affects the value generated in M&A deals and how the generated value is distributed between target and bidder shareholders. Moreover, a typical crisis affects the value generated and the distribution of value differently in developed and emerging countries. In particular, crisis time M&A deals generate more value if the target is from a developed country. Finally, financial crises may affect the type of deals that are undertaken and/or affect the pricing of deals. We investigate if differences in deal characteristics account for differences in the value generated and distributed. We conclude that targets operating in countries, which experience crisis, enjoy higher CARs in the full sample even after accounting for the differences in deal specifics.Item Open Access Stock-market reactions to mergers of non-financial Turkish firms(IIF, 2011-02-23) Hekimoglu, M. H.; Tanyeri, B.This paper investigates stock-market reactions to mergers and partial sales of non-financial Turkish firms. Turkish targets earn average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of 8.56 percent in the three-day window around merger announcements when bidders purchase control rights and 2.25 percent when they do not. The results indicate that acquirers pay a premium to purchase control rights. The smaller magnitude of target CAR in Turkish mergers (relative to CAR of around 20 percent in US and 10 percent in Europe) may be explained by: 1) the reduction in the power of event study method to capture the effect of merger announcements due to information leakages and misidentification of announcement dates; and 2) the differences in Turkish regulatory, operational and competitive environment.