Browsing by Subject "Nash bargaining solution"
Now showing 1 - 3 of 3
Results Per Page
Sort Options
Item Open Access Corruption, connections and transparency: does a better screen imply a better scene?(Springer New York LLC, 2001) Bac, M.A higher level of transparency in decision making increases the probability that corruption or wrongdoing is detected. It may also improve outsiders' information about the identities of key decision makers, thereby enhance incentives to establish "connections" for corruption. The connections effect may dominate the detection effect for local improvement in transparency and generate an increase in corruption, a prediction sharply in contrast with standard theories of transparency.Item Open Access Introduction(Springer, 2003) Koray, Semih; Sertel, M. R.; Sertel, M. R.; Koray, SemihA main feature that distinguishes the human species from others on earth can perhaps be best summarized as its ability to design. Other attributes distinguishing humans from other living beings can be regarded as derivatives of being a “designer”. The most tangible form of the designs achieved by mankind so far is that of tools, tools created in order to achieve some objective which precedes the existence of the tool. This notion of design applies to the most primitive as well as the most advanced tools, such as we see in modern production processes based on the so-called information technologies. Although design pertaining to tool-making in this sense is as old as mankind itself, its conscious application in the social and economic sphere is very modern, and a systematic treatment of social and economic design on a scientific basis is even more recent. Social and economic institutions have in many important cases evolved by spontaneous processes based on trial and error. Until the last century conscious social design was confined to certain modifications of already existing institutions. The creation of new institutions so as to achieve a socially targeted objective is very novel and yet awaits future societies to be put into practice with full strength.Item Open Access Nash bargaining solution under predonation(Bilkent University, 2008) Akyol, EthemWe consider two person bargaining problems under predonation. Before the bargaining solution is applied we allow the alteration of the bargaining set by means of pre-donations of a share in one’s would-be payoffs to one’s opponent. Thus, a pre-bargain stage is instituted in which the bargainers may manipulate, via pre-donations, the (Nash) bargaining solution as applied in the next stage.We firstly concentrate on the simple bargaining problems with bargaining sets that have linear pareto frontier and show that the stronger bargainer (with greater ideal payoff) giving a pre-donation, her best pre-donation transforming the bargaining set into one on which the Nash bargaining solution distributes payoffs so that while other bargainer gets exactly the same payoff (as applied to the original simple bargaining problem), stronger bargainer makes strictly better off. Then, we look for Stackelberg and Nash equilibria of the so called ”predonation game”. Furthermore, we list our results for two by two normal form games.