Browsing by Subject "Moral hazard"

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Open Access
Chapter 6: Banks
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2023-05-18) Gürkaynak, Refet S.; Wright, Jonathan H.; Zakrajšek, Egon
Banking is a particular model of financial intermediation whereby one institution takes in liquid deposits and makes longer-term, generally illiquid, loans. This is a very specific and potentially unstable form of financial intermediation. Nonetheless, it is ubiquitous over time and across countries. This chapter reviews the reasons why banks exist and are so important, and what impact they have on the real economy. It concludes with a discussion of stablecoins and central bank digital currencies, which are closely related to banking.
Open Access
Market reaction to risky banks: did generous deposit guarantee change it?
(Pergamon Press, 2008) Önder, Z.; Özyildirim, S.
Turkey experienced a massive banking crisis in February 2001, resulting in the loss of more than a thousand managerial jobs and the closure of 21% of all bank branches in the market. In this paper, we study the behavior of the market and the banks in Turkey before the crisis, from 1988 to 2000, which includes the period of full deposit insurance. The empirical results showed that not only depositors but also borrowers reacted negatively to risky banks and punished them even more during the period of generous government guarantee. However, in the same period, banks were found to increase their moral hazard behavior significantly. Although the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank recommend explicit deposit insurance for developing countries, the findings of this paper suggest that deposit insurance may not be an effective policy tool to improve market confidence, and it does not guarantee a stable economic environment even when the market reacts negatively to the moral hazard behavior of banks.
Open Access
The need for regulating a Bayesian regulator
(Springer New York LLC, 2005) Koray, S.; Saglam, I.
This paper analyzes the Baron and Myerson's (B-M) (Econometrica 50: 911-930 [1982]) scheme of monopoly regulation, a standard representative of Bayesian mechanisms. As is well known, the hboxB-M mechanism (and other related mechanisms) have as an explicit starting point the assumption that the regulator has an unchallenged prior belief about the cost function of the regulated monopolist.We analyze here the consequences resulting from the possibility that this prior belief may be subject to influence or manipulable. As we show in detail, under the B-M scheme, consumers and the regulated monopoly are highly sensitive to the regulator's prior belief about the (private) cost information of the monopolist. Therefore, if a regulator's beliefs are unaccountable to and unverifiable by a higher ity, the regulator has both the incentive and the possibility to change and/or misrepresent his prior belief when facing pressure or payoffs from interest groups representing consumers or the regulated firm. The results here show that the outcomes under a B-M mechanism favoring one or another interest group can vary over a wide spectrum. The results are consistent with capture theory and rent-seeking explanations of monopoly regulation and suggest the need to exercise care in using the insights and results of Bayesian regulatory theory to inform practice. © 2005 Springer Science+Business Media, Inc.