Browsing by Subject "Incentives"

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    Managerial motivation dynamics and incentives
    (2007) Kocabıyıkoğlu, A.; Popescu, I.
    Firms can increase profitability by appropriately motivating managers. We investigate drivers of managerial motivation, and propose how firms can use performance pay to alter motivational patterns. We focus on the agent's optimal effort decision in trading off compensation utility with effort cost in a static and dynamic setting. Surprisingly, we find that lower risk aversion or increased pay are not necessarily motivating factors, and identify the relevant effort drivers underlying the agent's utility and compensation plan. We characterize properties of agents' preferences for output lotteries (risk aversion, aggressiveness, prudence) that trigger systematic motivational patterns with respect to a variety of factors, such as the agent's productivity and past performance, time to evaluation, the firm's capabilities, and market factors. Our insights are robust, holding under very general modeling assumptions on preferences, rewards, and the stochastic effort-output function.
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    On explicit solutions of a two-echelon supply chain coordination game
    (Springer Verlag, 2018) Pınar, Mustafa Çelebi
    A contracting game under asymmetric information specific to two-echelon supply chain coordination between a retailer of unknown type and a supplier is studied. When the parameter which is private information to the retailer (holding cost) is known up to an interval of uncertainty, a uniform discrete approximation for retailer types leads to closed-form solutions where the joint (coordinated) optimal order quantity for a modified holding cost plays a major role. Furthermore, the closed-form solutions result in increasing information rent for higher types under easy-to-verify conditions involving strict lower limits on the total holding costs of retailer and supplier and the difference between uncoordinated optimal costs of consecutive retailer types.
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    The optimal structure of incentives in the principal–agent problem under the smooth ambiguity model
    (2018-07) Öztürk, Fatih
    We study a principal-agent problem where we model the uncertainty regarding the relationship between the level of effort and the monetary outcome using the smooth ambiguity model (Klibanoff et al., 2005). We provide comparative statics on the optimal wage scheme when the agent has constant absolute ambiguity aversion (CAAA) preferences. Our main result implies that whether the optimal wage scheme should be higher-powered or lower-powered depends on an intuitive measure of ambiguity.