Browsing by Subject "Impossibility"
Now showing 1 - 5 of 5
- Results Per Page
- Sort Options
Item Open Access Ceza koşulunun borçlunun borca aykırı davranıştaki kusuru ile ilişkisi nedir?(Marmara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi, 2018) Aksoy, Hüseyin Canİsviçre hukukunda ceza koşulunun borçlunun kusuruna bağlı olduğu konusunda neredeyse görüş birliği bulunmaktadır. Türk hukukunda ise ceza koşulu ve kusur arasındaki ilişki tartışmalıdır. Zira kimi yazarlar, cezanın yalnızca borçlunun kusuruyla borca aykırı davrandığı hallerde istenebileceğini kabul ederken, diğer bir görüşe göre cezanın istenebilmesi borçlunun kusuruna bağlı değildir. Bu görüşlerden hangisinin kabul edilmesi gerektiğinin tespiti, Türk Borçlar Kanunu’nun 180/2 ve 182/2 maddelerinin, hazırlık çalışmalarını da dikkate alarak, sözüyle ve özüyle yorumlanmasını gerektirir. Kanımızca, bu yorum neticesinde varılacak sonuç, taraflarca aksine anlaşma yapılmadıkça, borçlunun sözleşmeyle belirlenen cezayı ödeme borcunun kusurundan bağımsız olduğudur.Item Open Access Economic impossibility in Turkish contract law from the perspective of law and economics(Springer New York LLC, 2012) Aksoy, Hüseyin Can; Schafer, Hans-BerndWe argue that the proposed introduction of the doctrine of economic impossibility in Article 137 of the reform draft of the Turkish Code of Obligations is in line with economic considerations and facilitates business transactions. This new rule gives courts the explicit power to terminate a contract and relieve the party, which owes specific performance of its obligation, without imposing any duty to pay expectation damages to the other party. We argue that a court's decision to terminate a contract under economic impossibility should be based on three tests. First, a low-probability-event occurs between contract formation and performance. Second, this event causes an excessive increase in the costs of specific performance. Third, the concept of an excessive increase should take into due consideration the other party's interest in specific performance. The reform draft includes explicitly the first two tests, but not the third test. We also show under which conditions an excessive performance difficulty should not lead to termination of the contract but rather to an adjustment of the agreed price. We argue that the rule of economic impossibility, if diligently adjudicated, saves the parties transactions costs in comparison to a rule under which the law insists on specific performance or damage payments. We also argue that a specific rule of economic impossibility leads to better and more business-oriented solutions to the underlying problems than the alternative, which is to solve such problems under the broad and unspecific cover of the "good faith" or the "Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus" doctrine. © 2010 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.Item Open Access Essays in social choice theory(2009) Erol, SelmanIn this thesis, we investigate several issues concerning the class of Maskin monotonic social choice rules. Firstly, given a set of profiles, we find out which Maskin monotonic social choice rules adopt this set as a center. Then we introduce an algorithmic approach to find the self-monotonicities of a Maskin monotonic social choice rule. Moreover, we characterize all binary set operations that preserve Maskin monotonicity. Then we pass to investigating social choice functions, and determine the the domains of impossibility and possibility around a center with respect to a modified Manhattan metric. Finally, we try to reach a necessary and sufficient condition for Nash-implementability of a social choice in terms of neutralityItem Open Access Rethinking the relationship between the enforceability of penalty clauses and the debtor's fault in breach of his/her obligation under Swiss law(Akademie Ved Ceske Republiky * Ustav Statu a Prava, 2021-04-01) Aksoy, Hüseyin CanDespite the lack of an explicit provision within the Swiss Code of Obligations (OR), the considerable majority of the Swiss doctrine as well as the Federal Court accept that contractual penalty shall be paid if and only if the debtor’s breach is based on his/her fault. In this paper, we question such dogma and analyze the wording and purposes of Articles 161/2 and 163/2 of the Swiss Code of Obligations by taking their historical background into account. We argue that unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the debtor’s obligation to pay the penalty shall be deemed independent of his/her fault.Item Open Access Some results on monotonicity(2010) Dindar, HayrullahIn this thesis, we investigate several issues concerning social choice rules which satisfy different degrees of Maskin type monotonicities. Firstly, we introduce g −monotonicity and monotonicity region notions which enable one to compare monotonicity properties of non Maskin monotonic social choice rules. We compare self-monotonicities of standard scoring rules and study monotonicity of Majoritarian compromise. Secondly we determine domains of impossibility and possibility when the individual preferences are clustered around two opposing norms and the degree of clustering is measured via the M anhattan metric. In the last chapter we investigate the relation between monotonicity and dictatoriality when agents are allowed to have thick indifference classes.