Browsing by Subject "Experimental economics"

Now showing 1 - 3 of 3

Open Access
Endogenous game choice and giving behavior in distribution games
(MDPI, 2022-11-03) Karagözoğlu, Emin; Tosun, Elif
We experimentally investigated the effects of the possibility of taking in the dictator game and the choices of passive players between the dictator game and the taking game on the distribution decisions of active players. Our main findings support our hypothesis: when the dictator game is not exogenously given but chosen by the receivers (or passive players), this makes them accountable, which leads to less giving by dictators. We also conducted an online survey to gain further insights about our experimental results. Survey participants predicted most of the observed behavior in the experiment and explained the factors that might have driven the predicted behavior using reasoning similar to ours. Our results provide a new perspective for the dependence of giving in the dictator game on contextual factors. © 2022 by the authors.
Open Access
Endogenous selection into distribution games and effects on giving behavior
(2020-09) Tosun, Elif
In this thesis, we investigate effects of taking possibility in the dictator game and choice of passive players between the dictator game and the taking game on distribution decisions of active players where the dictator game setting in which the dictator can take from the initial endowment of the passive player is referred as the taking game. We use a betweensubjects design with three treatments, of which first two serve as control treatments: (i) exogenously assigned dictator game (EX-D), (ii) exogenously assigned taking game (EXT), and (iii) endogenous treatment where passive subjects choose to play either dictator game (EN-D) or taking game (EN-T). Our findings, in conformity with our hypotheses, suggest that (i) giving is less in EX-T (EN-T) than in EX-D (EN-D), (ii) passive players choose EN-D more frequently than they choose EN-T, (iii) the mere fact that EN-D is played due to the choice of passive player makes them accountable which leads to less giving by dictators in EN-D than in EX-D, finally (iv) giving in EN-T and EX-T are same. We also conduct an online survey to gain further insights about our experimental results. Survey participants can predict most of the observed behavior in the experiment and explain factors that might have driven predicted behavior using a reasoning similar to ours. To our knowledge, this is the first work to study endogenous game selection and its impacts on giving behavior in a dictator game setting by allowing passive players to choose the game they want to play.
Open Access
Magical thinking in an incomplete information bargaining game: an experimental study
(2024-07) Güngör, Kübra Nur
This thesis investigates the effect of magical thinking on individuals’ decision-making processes, with a specific focus on incomplete information ultimatum bargaining games. Hiding behind the small pie is a robust finding of this literature where the proposers use an information advantage for their personal gain. Using a simple ultimatum bargaining setup, we examine the impact of the timing of uncertainty resolution on the proposers’ offers and the frequency of hiding behind the small pie behavior. We employ a between-subject design with two treatments: BEF(ore) and AFT(er), varying the timing of randomization that determines the pie size without any variation in the information set of proposers across treatments. The probit regression analysis results suggest that treatment variation impacts the proposers’ tendency to hide behind the small pie, in line with our hypothesis. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study investigating the effect of magical thinking in a sequential bargaining game.