Browsing by Subject "Equilibrium (Economics)"
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Item Open Access Essays on endogenous time preference and strategic interaction(2013) Turan, Agah RehaThis thesis includes three self contained essays on the existence and qualitative properties of equilibrium dynamics under endogenous time preference. In the Örst essay, we reconsider the optimal growth model proposed by Stern (2006). We prove the almost everywhere di§erentiability of the value function and uniqueness of the optimal path, which were left as open questions and show how a small perturbation to the price of future oriented capital qualitatively changes the equilibrium dynamics. Almost none of the studies on endogenous time preference consider the strategic interaction among the agents. In the second essay, by considering a strategic growth model with endogenous time preference, we provide the su¢ cient conditions of supermodularity for dynamic games with open-loop strategies and show that the stationary state Nash equilibria tend to be symmetric. We numerically show that the initially rich can pull the poor out of poverty trap even when sustaining a higher level of steady state capital stock for itself. Lastly, in the third essay, we consider the socially determined time preference which depends on the level of Ösh stock and characterize the basic Öshery model under this setup. We provide existence of collusive and open-loop Nash equilibria and compare the e¢ ciency and qualitative properties of them.Item Open Access Limit sets of best-reply processes(2007) Aköz, Kemal KıvançI analyze limiting behavior of best-reply processes. I find that without inertia Nash Equilibria are not limit sets. Moreover, even for processes with inertia, Nash Equilibria are not stable. I argue that minimal CURB sets are reasonable candidates for limit sets if best-reply processes are indeterminate or Nash Equilibria satisfy evolutionary stability (Oechssler 1997). In such cases, limit sets necessarily contain a Nash Equilibrium. Otherwise limit sets may not be close to any Nash Equilibria unless they satisfy some support consistency condition.Item Open Access Modelling R&D and human capital for United States and European Union economies(2012) Kara, YaseminIn this thesis, regarding technological improvements and formation of human capital as the engine of growth, I investigated public policy whose objective is to enhance Total Factor Productivity (TFP) through investments in innovation for United States (US) and European Union (EU) economies. To this end, first I documented and compared the R&D expenditures and human capital expenditures of US and EU countries for last two decades. Then, taking 2008 as base year I constructed Social Accounting Matrices (SAM) for both economies. Finally, I conducted subsidization policy with a general equilibrium model and investigated effects of public policy on economic growth, social wealth and welfare. In this study, I found that R&D subsidization policy enhances economic growth, social wealth and welfare in both countries but the enhancement is larger for EU economy.Item Open Access Nash equilibria in claim based estate division problems(2014) İnel, AbdulkadirEstate division game is an allocation of an estate between players based on a rule. In this thesis, we consider estate division games and study the necessary and sufficient conditions for division rules under which Nash equilibria induce equal division. Ashlagi, Karag¨ozoˇglu, Klaus (2012) introduce classes of properties for division rules and show that they are sufficient for all Nash equilibria to induce equal division. In this study, we propose a different property, namely conditional full compensation, and prove that it is also a sufficient condition for division rules in order for all Nash equilibria outcomes under these rules to be equal division. We, then, show that under any rule satisfying claims boundedness and conditional equal division lower bound, equal division is a Nash equilibrium outcome. Finally, we prove that letting at least one player get more than the difference between the whole estate and the sum of other players’ claims is a necessary condition for all Nash equilibria to induce equal division.Item Open Access A new approach to age and risk taking behavior of agents(2012) Kozan, ZeynepIn this thesis, we use evolutionary game theory techniques to analyze the relation between risk taking behavior of agents and their ages. We suppose that risk aversion is the stable pattern for the old agents and risk seeking is the stable pattern for the young agents as it is commonly assumed so in economics literature. First, we solve a benchmark model without heterogeneity in terms of age di§erentiations. In such a case, we observe that mutation either increases or decreases with respect to the payo§ levels, depending on the initial Ötness levels of the population groups. In the second step, we introduce heterogeneous population frontier. The anticipated level of the initial mutant proportion provides incentives to triger the evolution. Then, we analyze numerically the e§ects of the initial level of Ötness, initial risk averse and risk seeking proportions on the pattern of the evolution process. Finally, we studied the intertemporal e§ects of di§erent risk averse and risk seeking population proportions on mutation.Item Open Access Preservation of implementability under algebraic operations(2011) Doğan, SerhatIn this thesis, we investigate whether union and intersection preserve Nash and subgame perfect implementability. Nash implementability is known to be preserved under union. Here we first show that, under some reasonably mild assumptions, Nash implementability is also preserved under intersection. The conjunction of these two results yields an almost lattice-like structure for Nash implementable social choice rules. Next, we carry over these results to subgame perfect implementability by employing similar arguments. Finally, based on the fact that Nash implementable social choice rules are closed under union, we provide a new characterization of Nash implementability, which also exemplifies the potential use of our findings for further research.Item Restricted Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure(1990) Van Huyck, John B.