Browsing by Subject "Economic stabilization."
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Item Open Access Is a loan tax optimal in the presence of leaning against the loan wind policy?(Bilkent University, 2013) Çelik, ŞivaThis thesis aims to figure out an optimal combination of monetary policy tools and macroprudential tools in order to maintain both financial stability and price stability. In particular, given that monetary policy authority already considers loan growth in its objective function, it asks whether an additional macroprudential tool, a loan tax, is welfare-improving. For this purpose, it constructs a simple New Keynesian Model with capital and banking sector. By incorporating loan growth in a loss function, monetary policy authority chooses the optimum weights and derives a Taylor-type interest rate rule, which could be also called as leaning against the credit winds. Then, it adds an endogenous tax rule and compares the minimum mean values of loss function. The result of simulations suggest that a tax rule that responses to deviations from steady state value of growth, inflation and loan growth leads lower loss values, thus, the inclusion of tax in the policy rule set is welfareimprovingItem Open Access On stability and efficiency in different economic environments(Bilkent University, 2011) Karakaya, MehmetThis thesis consists of four main chapters. In the first main part, hedonic coalition formation games where each player’s preferences rely only upon the members of her coalition are studied. A new stability notion under free exit-free entry membership rights, referred to as strong Nash stability, is introduced which is stronger than both core and Nash stabilities studied earlier in the literature. The weak top-choice property is introduced and shown to be sufficient for the existence of a strongly Nash stable partition. It is also shown that descending separable preferences guarantee the existence of a strongly Nash stable partition. Strong Nash stability under different membership rights is also studied. In the first main part, hedonic coalition formation games are also extended to cover formation games, where a player can be a member of several different coalitions, and these games are studied. In the second main part, Nash implementability of a social choice rule (via a mechanism) which is implementable via a Rechtsstaat is studied. A new condition on a Rechtsstaat, referred to as equal treatment of equivalent alternatives (ET EA), is introduced, and it is shown that if a social choice rule is implementable via some Rechtsstaat satisfying ET EA then it is Nash implementable via a mechanism provided that there are at least three agents in the society. In the third main part, a characterization of the Borda rule on the domain of weak preferences is studied. A new property, which is referred to as the degree equality, is introduced, and it is shown that the Borda rule is characterized by weak neutrality, reinforcement, faithfulness and degree equality. In the fourth main part, the graduate admissions problem with quota and budget constraints is studied as a two sided many to one matching market. The students proposing algorithm, which is an extension of the Gale-Shapley algorithm, is constructed, and it is shown that the students proposing algorithm ends up with a core stable matching if the algorithm stops. However, there exist graduate admissions problems for which there exist core stable matchings, while neither the departments proposing nor the students proposing algorithm stops. It is proved that the students proposing algorithm stops if and only if no cycle occurs in the algorithm. It is also shown that no random path to core stability for the graduate admissions problem exists.