Browsing by Subject "Economic order quantity models"
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Item Open Access Design and analysis of mechanisms for decentralized joint replenishment(Elsevier B.V., 2017) Güler, K.; Körpeoğlu, E.; Şen, A.We consider jointly replenishing multiple firms that operate under an EOQ like environment in a decentralized, non-cooperative setting. Each firm's demand rate and inventory holding cost rate are private information. We are interested in finding a mechanism that would determine the joint replenishment frequency and allocate the joint ordering costs to these firms based on their reported stand-alone replenishment frequencies (if they were to order independently). We first provide an impossibility result showing that there is no direct mechanism that simultaneously achieves efficiency, incentive compatibility, individual rationality and budget-balance. We then propose a general, two-parameter mechanism in which one parameter is used to determine the joint replenishment frequency, another is used to allocate the order costs based on firms’ reports. We show that efficiency cannot be achieved in this two-parameter mechanism unless the parameter governing the cost allocation is zero. When the two parameters are same (a single parameter mechanism), we find the equilibrium share levels and corresponding total cost. We finally investigate the effect of this parameter on equilibrium behavior. We show that properly adjusting this parameter leads to mechanisms that are better than other mechanisms suggested earlier in the literature in terms of fairness and efficiency. © 2016 Elsevier B.V.Item Open Access Non-cooperative joint replenishment under asymmetric information(Elsevier, 2013) Körpeoğlu, E.; Şen, A.; Güler, K.We consider jointly replenishing n ex-ante identical firms that operate under an EOQ like setting using a non-cooperative game under asymmetric information. In this game, each firm, upon being privately informed about its demand rate (or inventory cost rate), submits a private contribution to an intermediary that specifies how much it is willing to pay for its replenishment per unit of time and the intermediary determines the maximum feasible frequency for the joint orders that would finance the fixed replenishment cost. We show that a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists and characterize the equilibrium in this game. We also show that the contributions are monotone increasing in each firm's type. We finally conduct a numerical study to compare the equilibrium to solutions obtained under independent and cooperative ordering, and under full information. The results show that while information asymmetry eliminates free-riding in the contributions game, the resulting aggregate contributions are not as high as under full information, leading to higher aggregate costs.