Browsing by Subject "Discouragement effect"

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    Multi-player race
    (Elsevier B.V., 2018) Doğan, S.; Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, K.; Sağlam, Ç.
    We present a model of race with multiple players and study players’ effort choices and expected prizes in equilibrium. We show that, in equilibrium, once any two players win one battle each, the remaining players do not exert any effort anymore. This turns the continuation game into a two-player race. This is different than the results in previous two-player models of race, which report that all states of the game are reached with positive probabilities. We also provide a set of comparative static results on the effects of the number of players and the victory threshold.
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    Perseverance and suspense in tug-of-war
    (Elsevier, 2021-01-06) Karagözoğlu, Emin; Sağlam, Hüseyin Çağrı; Turan, A. R.
    We study a tug-of-war game between two players using the lottery contest success function (CSF) and a quadratic cost (of effort) function. We construct a pure strategy symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium of this game, show that it is unique, and provide closed-form solutions for equilibrium strategies and values. In stark contrast to a model of tug-of-war with an all-pay auction CSF, players exert positive efforts until the very last battle in this equilibrium. We deliver a set of empirically appealing results on effort dynamics.
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    Sabotage in team contests
    (Springer, 2019) Doğan, Serhat; Keskin, K.; Sağlam, Çağrı
    In the contest literature, sabotage is defined as a deliberate and costly activity that damages the opponent’s likelihood of winning the contest. Most of the existing results suggest that, anticipating a possible sabotage, contestants would be discouraged from exerting high efforts. In this paper we investigate the act of sabotage in a team contest wherein team members exert costly efforts as a contribution to their team’s aggregate effort, which in turn determines the contest’s outcome. For the baseline model with no sabotage, there exists a corner equilibrium implying a free-rider problem in each team. As for the model with sabotage, our characterization of Nash equilibrium reveals two important results: (i) a unique interior equilibrium exists so that the free-rider problem no longer is a concern and (ii) the discouragement effect of sabotage vanishes for some players. On top of those conclusions, we investigate the team owner’s problems of prize allocation and team formation with the objective being to maximize his team’s winning probability.