Browsing by Subject "Dictatorship"
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Item Open Access An impossibility result regarding behavioral implementation of efficiency with two individuals(Bilkent University, 2023-12) Uçkaç, ÖmerThis thesis examines Nash implementation of behaviorally efficient social choice rules á la de Clippel (2014) with two individuals under the full behavioral domain, i.e., when individuals’ choices do not satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preferences. We propose a new definition of a dictatorial social choice rule in the full behavioral domain and show that when there are at least four alternatives, a behaviorally efficient social choice rule á la de Clippel (2014) is implementable if and only if it is dictatorial according to our definition whenever there are only two individuals under consideration. Our result parallels the impossibility result of Maskin (1999), which says that in the full rational domain, a social choice rule that satisfies the Pareto property is implementable if and only if it is dictatorial whenever there are only two individuals in the society.Item Open Access Explorations on X-self selectivity(Bilkent University, 2017-09) Kerman, ToygarX-self selectivity of a social choice function is de ned as being self selective relative to the set of test functions X and all of its subsets. We explore the self-selectivity of social choice functions which satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives, against di erent kinds of sets of test functions. We observe that testing against a smaller set can be su cient to deduce that a given social choice function is also self-selective relative to a larger set, under certain conditions. Moreover, we show that X-self selectivity is closed under set intersection and union. This leads to the notion of degree of self-selectivity, which allows us to compare the self-selectivities of two social choice functions under certain conditions.Item Open Access Schmitt, Carl (1888-1985)(Elsevier Inc., 2015) Vinx, L.Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) was a conservative German public lawyer and political theorist. Schmitt is best known for his trenchant critique of liberal constitutionalism, parliamentary democracy, and legal cosmopolitanism. His contributions to debate on these issues continue to attract scholarly attention today, but they are considered to be highly controversial, due to Schmitt's association with National Socialism. This article presents an overview of the key themes and arguments in Schmitt's major writings, and it offers an assessment of Schmitt's relevance for contemporary political, legal, and constitutional theory. © 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Item Open Access Self-selective social choice functions verify arrow and gibbard-satterthwaite theorems(Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2000) Koray, S.This paper introduces a new notion of consistency for social choice functions, called self-selectivity, which requires that a social choice function employed by a society to make a choice from a given alternative set it faces should choose itself from among other rival such functions when it is employed by the society to make this latter choice as well. A unanimous neutral social choice function turns out to be universally self-selective if and only if it is Paretian and satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives. The neutral unanimous social choice functions whose domains consist of linear order profiles on nonempty sets of any finite cardinality induce a class of social welfare functions that inherit Paretianism and independence of irrelevant alternatives in case the social choice function with which one starts is universally self-selective. Thus, a unanimous and neutral social choice function is universally self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial. Moreover, universal self-selectivity for such functions is equivalent to the conjunction of strategy-proofness and independence of irrelevant alternatives or the conjunction of monotonicity and independence of irrelevant alternatives again.