Browsing by Subject "Delegation of authority."

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    Delegation in a duopolistic differentiated goods market with Bertrand competition
    (1995) Yıldırım, Hüseyin
    The impact of delegation in a firm has been observed by many modern authors. Vickers(1985), Fershtman and Judd(1987), Sklivas(1987) considered the problem as part of positive economic theory whereas Koray and Sertel(1989) treated it as a regulation problem. We examine a similar problem for a duopolistic dilTerentiated good market with Bertrand competition and lengthen the delegation chain to 5 managers. Our findings show that the firms’ profits are monotonically increasing, i.e. there is a positive incentive to redelegate for each firm. Our natural conjecture is that, in the limit, firms reach collusion non-cooperatively.
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    Delegation in a duopolistic differentiated goods market with Cournot competition
    (1995) Ünver, Mustafa Utku
    We consider the impact of delegation in a Cournotic duopoly with differentiated goods upon the firms’ profit maximization behavior. In an oligopoly, delegation in each firm can be modeled through a specific non-cooperative game. Delegation games in a differentiated goods market with affine demand are studied within the Cournot competition concept where redelegation is permitted in a symmetric duopoly. The following results are demonstrated: The maximand delegated by each primary delegator, i.e. owner of each firm, converges in monotonically decreasing fashion to the true profit function in the absence of delegation costs, and total industry output at the Cournot equilibrium converges in monotonically increasing fashion to some output level. Welfare changes due to redelegation are also considered.
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    Regulation via supply function equilibria
    (2006) Hüseynov, Tural
    In this study we attempt to analyze the delegation problem via supply function equilibria in the intermanagerial game. We obtain that in a duopoly where firms play a supply function game an infinite number of equilibrium outcomes exists. Due to this fact one should first make a selection among these equilibrium outcomes in order to apply to delegation games. An artificial selection of an a priori intended outcome leads us to designing mechanisms. We demonstrate several regulatory mechanisms. Moreover, we show that the socially ε-best outcome can be implemented via supply function equilibria as well.