Browsing by Subject "Computer crime"
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Item Open Access Detecting compromised routers via packet forwarding behavior(2008) Mizrak, A.T.; Savage, S.; Marzullo, K.While it is widely understood that criminal miscreants are subverting large numbers of Internet-connected computers (e.g., for bots, spyware, SPAM forwarding), it is less well appreciated that Internet routers are also being actively targeted and compromised. Indeed, due to its central role in end-to-end communication, a compromised router can be leveraged to empower a wide range of direct attacks including eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle subterfuge, and denial of service. In response, a range of specialized anomaly detection protocols has been proposed to detect misbehaving packet forwarding between routers. This article provides a general framework for understanding the design space of this work and reviews the capabilities of various detection protocols. © 2008 IEEE.Item Open Access Effects of cognitive styles on 2D drafting and design performance in digital media(Springer Netherlands, 2010) Pektas, S.T.This paper investigates the interactions between design students' cognitive styles, as measured by Riding's Cognitive Styles Analysis, and performance in 2D drafting and design tasks in digital media. An empirical research revealed that Imager students outperformed Verbalisers in both drafting and creativity scores. Wholist-Analytic cognitive style dimension was found to be independent from drafting and design performance. The study suggests that examining the cognitive styles of students in Computer Aided Design (CAD) education deserves further attention and may facilitate for improvements in learning processes. © 2008 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.Item Open Access Securing legacy firefox extensions with SENTINEL(Springer, 2013-07) Onarlıoğu, K.; Battal, Mustafa; Robertson, W.; Kırda, E.A poorly designed web browser extension with a security vulnerability may expose the whole system to an attacker. Therefore, attacks directed at "benign-but-buggy" extensions, as well as extensions that have been written with malicious intents pose significant security threats to a system running such components. Recent studies have indeed shown that many Firefox extensions are over-privileged, making them attractive attack targets. Unfortunately, users currently do not have many options when it comes to protecting themselves from extensions that may potentially be malicious. Once installed and executed, the extension needs to be trusted. This paper introduces Sentinel, a policy enforcer for the Firefox browser that gives fine-grained control to the user over the actions of existing JavaScript Firefox extensions. The user is able to define policies (or use predefined ones) and block common attacks such as data exfiltration, remote code execution, saved password theft, and preference modification. Our evaluation of Sentinel shows that our prototype implementation can effectively prevent concrete, real-world Firefox extension attacks without a detrimental impact on users' browsing experience. © 2013 Springer-Verlag.