Browsing by Subject "Computation"

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    Computational implementation
    (Review of Economic Design, 2022-12) Barlo, M.; Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün
    Following a theoretical analysis of the scope of Nash implementation for a given mechanism, we study the formal framework for computational identification of Nash implementability. We provide computational tools for Nash implementation in finite environments. In particular, we supply Python codes that identify (i) the domain of preferences that allows Nash implementation by a given mechanism, (ii) the maximal domain of preferences that a given mechanism Nash implements Pareto efficiency, (iii) all consistent collections of sets of a given social choice correspondence (SCC), the existence of which is a necessary condition for Nash implementation of this SCC, and (iv) check whether some of the well-known sufficient conditions for Nash implementation hold for a given SCC. Our results exhibit that the computational identification of all collections consistent with an SCC enables the planner to design appealing mechanisms. © 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.
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    Computationalism: Still the only game in town-A reply to Swiatczak's "Conscious representations: An intractable problem for the computational theory of mind"
    (Springer Netherlands, 2012-02-18) Davenport, D.
    Mental representations, Swiatczak (Minds Mach 21:19-32, 2011) argues, are fundamentally biochemical and their operations depend on consciousness; hence the computational theory of mind, based as it is on multiple realisability and purely syntactic operations, must be wrong. Swiatczak, however, is mistaken. Computation, properly understood, can afford descriptions/explanations of any physical process, and since Swiatczak accepts that consciousness has a physical basis, his argument against computationalism must fail. Of course, we may not have much idea how consciousness (itself a rather unclear plurality of notions) might be implemented, but we do have a hypothesis-that all of our mental life, including consciousness, is the result of computational processes and so not tied to a biochemical substrate. Like it or not, the computational theory of mind remains the only game in town. © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011.