Browsing by Subject "Complete information"

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Open Access
A beam search algorithm to optimize robustness under random machine breakdowns and processing time variability
(Institute of Industrial Engineers, 2007) Gören, S.; Sabuncuoğlu, İhsan
The vast majority of the machine scheduling research assumes complete information about the scheduling problem and a static environment in which scheduling systems operate. In practice, however, scheduling systems are subject to considerable uncertainty in dynamic environments. The ability to cope with the uncertainty in scheduling process is becoming increasingly important in today's highly dynamic and competitive business environments. In the literature, two approaches have appeared as the effective way: reactive and proactive scheduling. The objective in reactive scheduling is to revise schedules as necessary, while proactive scheduling attempts to incorporate future disruptions when generating schedules. In this paper we take a proactive scheduling approach to solve a machine scheduling problem with two sources of uncertainty: processing time variability and machine breakdowns. We define two robustness measures and develop a heuristic based on beam search methodology to optimize them. The computational results show that the proposed algorithms perform significantly better than a number of heuristics available in the literature.
Open Access
Order of limits in reputations
(Springer, 2016) Dalkıran, N. A.
The fact that small departures from complete information might have large effects on the set of equilibrium payoffs draws interest in the adverse selection approach to study reputations in repeated games. It is well known that these large effects on the set of equilibrium payoffs rely on long-run players being arbitrarily patient. We study reputation games where a long-run player plays a fixed stage-game against an infinite sequence of short-run players under imperfect public monitoring. We show that in such games, introducing arbitrarily small incomplete information does not open the possibility of new equilibrium payoffs far from the complete information equilibrium payoff set. This holds true no matter how patient the long-run player is, as long as her discount factor is fixed. This result highlights the fact that the aforementioned large effects arise due to an order of limits argument, as anticipated. Â© 2016, Springer Science+Business Media New York.