Browsing by Subject "Choice function"
Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
Results Per Page
Sort Options
Item Open Access Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain(Springer, 2003) Koray, S.; Unel, B.Self-selectivity is a new kind of consistency pertaining to social choice rules. It deals with the problem of whether a social choice rule selects itself from among other rival such rules when a society is also to choose the choice rule that it will employ in making its choice from a given set of alternatives. Koray shows that a neutral and unanimous social choice function is universally self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial. In this paper, we confine the available social choice functions to the tops-only domain and examine whether such restriction allow us to escape the dictatoriality result. A neutral, unanimous, and tops-only social choice function, however, turns out to be self-selective relative to the tops-only domain if and only if it is top-monotonic, and thus again dictatorial.Item Open Access Every choice function is pro-con rationalizable(Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), 2022-06-22) Doğan, Serhat; Yıldız, KemalWe consider an agent who is endowed with two sets of orderings: pro- and con-orderings. For each choice set, if an alternative is the top-ranked by a pro-ordering (con-ordering), then this is a pro (con) for choosing that alternative. The alternative with more pros than cons is chosen from each choice set. Each ordering may have a weight reflecting its salience. In this case, the probability that an alternative is chosen equals the difference between the total weights of its pros and cons. We show that every nuance of the rich human choice behavior can be captured via this structured model. Our technique requires a generalization of the Ford-Fulkerson theorem, which may be of independent interest. As an application of our results, we show that every choice rule is plurality-rationalizable.