Browsing by Subject "Central bank independence"

Now showing 1 - 3 of 3

Open Access
Central bank independence and economic performance in eastern Europe
(Elsevier BV, 2001) Neyapti, B.
Following the breakdown of central planning by the early 1990s, transition economies faced varying measures of the need for economic restructuring and stabilisation. This paper examines both the trends in economic performance in eight eastern European countries and the degree of central bank independence (CBI) granted after reforms. The evidence of the paper indicates that both the measures of CBI and the measures of financial market development (FMD) show significant association with macroeconomic variables. Also, the sample exhibits positive association between CBI and measures of FMD. © 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Open Access
Central bank independence, government political orientation and optimum government expenditure financing
(Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2002) Berument, Hakan; Önder, A. Ö.
This paper extends the government optimum expenditure financing model by incorporating the effects of both the government's political orientation and the central bank's independence. For the panel data of fourteen OECD countries for the period from 1974 to 1997, this paper shows first that countries with higher levels of central bank independence generate less seigniorage revenue, and second that governments which are controlled by left-wing parties create more seigniorage revenue to finance their spending.
Open Access
Fractionalization effect and government financing
(Institute of International Economic Studies, 2005) Berument, Hakan; Heckelman, J. C.
The weak government argument claims that fractionalized governments (coalition or minority governments) have more difficulty increasing their tax revenues or decreasing their spending than majority governments. This implies that weaker governments are associated with higher government deficits. In this paper, we test the implication of a fractionalization effect within the optimum financing model that suggests governments raise both their tax and seigniorage revenues to finance additional spending. We test the hypothesis for a sample of ten OECD countries for the period 1975-1997 and extend the period for the non-EU nations in the sample to cover 1975-2003. The empirical evidence presented here supports a positive relationship between the degree of fractionalization and seigniorage revenue. Our results also suggest that creation of seigniorage revenue is lower under right-wing governments and an independent central bank.