Browsing by Subject "Action-based approaches"

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Open Access
Age 4 transitions: Reflection as a domain-general development for explicit reasoning
(Elsevier Ltd, 2021-07) Allen, Jedediah W. P.; Çelik, Bartuğ; Bichard, M. H.
The literature provides many examples of important developments across different social and cognitive domains at around age 4. Based on an action-based approach to cognition - interactivism - we argue that the changes across different domains can be explained by the development of a domain-general cognitive enabling: reflection. The interactivist model’s claim about reflection was empirically supported on the basis of a novel object-reasoning task called Leaning Blocks (LB) developed by Allen and Bickhard (2018). In the current study, there were three aims. First, to replicate the age 4 shift on the LB task in a non-western sample. Second, to explore the LB task’s relations with Executive Functioning skills (working memory, cognitive flexibility, and inhibitory control) in order to test alternative interpretations of performance on LB. Third, to diversify the measurement of reflective reasoning with two new tasks based on Piaget’s categorization of mental imagery. The results showed a replication of Allen and Bickhard’s 2018 findings on the LB task and failed to show any relations with the EF measures after controlling for age. One of the new reflection tasks (Candy Monster) showed both the age 4 transition and a correlation with LB (before-and-after controlling for age and the EF measures). Overall, as in Allen and Bickhard (2018) the current study’s results support the interactivist model’s claim that the development of reflection is responsible for the transitions in performance across domains in a “stage-like” fashion.
Open Access
Emergent constructivism : theoretical and methodological considerations
(S. Karger AG, 2022-07-29) Allen, Jedediah W.P.
Nativist and empiricist approaches require foundationalism because they cannot account for the emergence of representation. Foundationalism is the assumption of an innate representational base. In turn, foundationalism places limits on the nature of learning as a constructivist process. In contrast, action-based approaches can account for the emergence of representation through (inter)action. In so doing, action-based approaches can pursue an emergent constructivism for learning and development. Despite the theoretical symmetry between nativism and empiricism with respect to foundationalism, there is an asymmetry in nativist and empiricist research programs. Nativism generally ignores constructivist complexity that non-nativist approaches assume needs to be investigated empirically. In practice, this means that the plethora of nativist looking-time studies do not provide adequate control conditions for the rich interpretations drawn from such research. Instead, it is the a priori assumptions of nativism doing the justification. Without such assumptions, the meaning of the data is unclear at best. Importantly, the problem of a priori assumptions driving rich interpretations is not specific to nativism or looking methodologies. Mindreading as a research program also engages in rich interpretations for studies that concern social-cognition from infancy through preschool. Similarly, these studies do not include the types of control conditions motivated by more constructivist thinking. To the extent that empiricist research programs incorporate constructivist thinking into research, they converge with action-based approaches. This creates a sort of methodological bridge between lean-empiricist research programs and action-based approaches. However, this bridge has limitations that we illustrate through an example concerning maternal mental-state discourse and theory of mind development. The ultimate conclusions are threefold: (a) Action-based approaches are the best theoretical framework for understanding learning and development; (b) constructivist methodology is multiply motivated; (c) there are varying degrees of methodological commensurability between empiricism and action-based approaches. © 2022 Human Development
Open Access
Self/other differentiation based on present VS past tense cues in Turkish culture
(2021-07) Çelik, Salih Bartuğ
The literature provides various studies that showed human beings’ implicit awareness of their own and others’ mental states (i.e., implicit Theory of Mind, ToM abilities). However, how much these implicit processes are qualitatively different from the explicit ToM abilities is an open question to investigate. To explore this issue, Bradford et al. (2015; 2018) conducted a study that showed it was easier for adults to adopt “self” perspectives than “other” perspectives. Importantly, participants found shifting from other- to self-oriented perspectives easier than shifting from self- to other. Bradford et al. concluded that self-oriented mental states might be automatically processed when thinking about others but that other-oriented mental state attribution requires consciously controlled processes. In the current study, we explored whether the task demands from Bradford et al.’s study affect participants’ performances across shifting conditions. Self-oriented perspectives might be always processed faster than other-oriented perspectives because they might include more concrete cues (e.g., past and personal experiences). To provide more concrete cues for the other-oriented perspective questions, participants were presented with Bradford et al.’s paradigm using the Turkish past-tense with the direct evidential marker, -DI. This manipulation allowed investigating whether other-oriented perspectives could be processed as fast as self-oriented perspectives. In order to also investigate the impact of cultural factors on the participants’ performances, an Individuals-Collectivism survey was included. The results of the study showed similar findings with Bradford et al. (2015; 2018) in that participants more easily shifted from other- to self-oriented perspectives compared to self- to other-oriented perspectives. The results were discussed based on the current approaches (i.e., lean, middle-ground, and rich accounts) to social cognition.
Open Access
Stage fright: internal reflection as a domain general enabling constraint on the emergence of explicit thought
(Elsevier, 2018) Allen, Jedediah W.P.; Bickhard, M. H.
It has become increasingly clear over the last half century that there are multiple importantchanges in children’s abilities taking place at around age 4. These changes span social, emotional,and cognitive domains. While some researchers have argued that a domain-general developmentexplains some of the changes, such a position is a minority view. In the current article, weprovide some evidence for the development of an age 4 domain-general enabling constraint onchildren’s ability to reflect. In turn, the development of reflection is argued to enable the tran-sitions that we see within and across developmental domains. The model of reflection beingoffered is part of a broader action-based model of cognition and mind–interactivism (Bickhard,1973, 1978, 2009a,b). The empirical part of the article presents a new object reasoning task. Thistask was derived from theoretical constraints on the interactivist models of knowing and re-flection. Results indicated that most children responded to the task incorrectly until age 4 whichwas interpreted as evidence that they lacked the ability to explicitly reason about relations be-tween objects. Correlations between our new task and standard false-belief tasks were explored.Collectively, these results provide empirical support for the claim that children undergo a do-main-general development in their ability for epistemic reflection at around age 4