Department of International Relations

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Browsing Department of International Relations by Subject "Alliances"

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    A dance of entanglement: the US-Turkish relations in the context of the Syrian conflict
    (Uluslararası İlişkiler Konseyi(UİK), 2019-06) Sarı Karademir, Burcu
    Alliances under unipolarity operate with different logic than under bipolarity. Unipolarity makes the twin dangers of abandonment and entrapment more likely for the weaker states that need the unipole for the pursuit of their regional security interests. The article takes the US-Turkish relations within the context of Syrian conflict as exemplary and shows how the strategic discrepancies between the US-Turkish positions paved the way for Turkey’s abandonment in Syria. The article concludes that the unipole’s strategic alliance commitments are no longer reliable for regional allies to assume risky regional restructuring roles as they face the risk of abandonment on the halfway.
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    How to entrap your protector: reassessing entrapment in light of the Crimean War crisis
    (Cambridge University Press, 2024-11-27) Onea, Tudor Andrei
    Recent scholarship often dismisses entrapment, arguing that there are hardly any identifiable cases; and that powerful states (protectors) can sidestep it by narrowing the treaty conditions under which they have to intervene to defend their weaker allies (protégés). Consequently, alliances and partnerships are nearly always considered risk-free assets. However, this paper argues that several types of entrapment are present. The paper is foremost concerned with classic entrapment, a type referring to a purposeful effort by the protégé to drag the protector into a conflict serving primarily the protégé’s interests. The protégé entraps the protector by placing itself deliberately in danger of defeat and by manipulating the protector’s domestic audience costs. Classic entrapment is likely to succeed under two conditions: (a) when the protégé’s allegiance confers the protector an advantage in a competition against other powerful states; and (b) in informal arrangements, in which there is no clear cut-off point to the protector’s commitment. The paper provides an illustration in the Ottoman Empire’s entrapment of Britain in the crisis preceding the Crimean War. The conclusion considers classic entrapment’s feasibility in present world politics, particularly in the context of Taiwan.
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    Nuclear topsy turvy: the security-economics nexus in Turkish-American relations
    (Routledge, 2024-10-16) Gheorghe, Eliza; İplikçi, Murat; Tokatlı, Fatih
    This article discusses the shift in Turkey's nuclear alliance with the United States from client to junior partner. Ankara sought to bring the Turkish economy and military forces in line with those of its patron to signal its loyalty. But power asymmetries made it so that Washington became Ankara's lifeline. From the 1950s until the mid-1960s, American policymakers applied a top-down style of alliance management, making important decisions without consulting Ankara. But the mid-1960s marked a turning point in the nature of this relationship, as Turkey became better able to stand on its own feet. Rather than relying on unilateral measures, the Americans had to consult and coordinate with Ankara. Also, Turkey could reject key American proposals involving nuclear weapons, such as the creation of a Multilateral Force for NATO, and even create some ambiguity about its nuclear intentions to signal its loss of faith in the American security guarantee.