Browsing by Author "Gheorghe, Eliza"

Now showing 1 - 5 of 5

Open Access
Balance of power redux: Nuclear alliances and the logic of extended deterrence
(Oxford University Press, 2022-03-01) Gheorghe, Eliza
How do unbalanced nuclear alliances provide extended nuclear deterrence (END) to their members? Why have nuclear alliances chosen certain types of END strategy and not others? Existing accounts regard END as a function of the inter-alliance balance of power, regime type, or institutional design. END strategies inspired by theories focused on regime type and institutional design have not yet materialised, while the inter-alliance balance of power does not suffice to explain the choice of END strategy. To elucidate variations in END strategy, this article puts forward an argument centred on the intra-alliance balance of power. Drawing on the history of the US-led and the Soviet-led alliances during the Cold War, namely North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact, it shows how the two superpowers changed their approach to defending their allies with nuclear weapons according to quantitative and qualitative shifts in the distribution of power within the alliance.
Open Access
Nuclear topsy turvy: the security-economics nexus in Turkish-American relations
(Routledge, 2024-10-16) Gheorghe, Eliza; İplikçi, Murat; Tokatlı, Fatih
This article discusses the shift in Turkey's nuclear alliance with the United States from client to junior partner. Ankara sought to bring the Turkish economy and military forces in line with those of its patron to signal its loyalty. But power asymmetries made it so that Washington became Ankara's lifeline. From the 1950s until the mid-1960s, American policymakers applied a top-down style of alliance management, making important decisions without consulting Ankara. But the mid-1960s marked a turning point in the nature of this relationship, as Turkey became better able to stand on its own feet. Rather than relying on unilateral measures, the Americans had to consult and coordinate with Ankara. Also, Turkey could reject key American proposals involving nuclear weapons, such as the creation of a Multilateral Force for NATO, and even create some ambiguity about its nuclear intentions to signal its loss of faith in the American security guarantee.
Open Access
Peace for atoms. US non-proliferation policy and the Romanian role in the Sino-American rapprochement, 1969-1971
(Routledge, 2018-02-02) Gheorghe, Eliza
By 1970, the United States had undergone a remarkable volte-face on dealing with People’s Republic of China as a nuclear weapon state, from outspoken opposition to political recognition. Aware of the importance of co-opting Beijing in the emerging multipolar order, President Richard Nixon sought any possible opening to the Chinese leadership. One secret backchannel passed through Bucharest, whom Washington rewarded with sensitive atomic assistance for its good offices. If in the mid-1960s dealing with China was regarded as detrimental to the cause of nonproliferation, by the early 1970s, the United States relaxed its nuclear exports policy towards useful adversaries, such as Romania, all in pursuit of geopolitical interests.
Open Access
Playing to the audience: responses to violations of international order
(University of Chicago Press, 2024-01) Bas, Muhammet A.; Coe, Andrew J.; Gheorghe, Eliza
When international laws or norms are violated, an enforcer can punish the violator, offer concessions for its renewed compliance, or tolerate it. Punishment is often costlier than concessions or toleration but signals to other states that violation will be met with penalties rather than rewards or acceptance. By influencing other states’ expectations about what will happen if they get caught violating, the choice of response can thus encourage or discourage subsequent compliance. Anticipating this, an enforcer is more willing to punish when it faces a larger audience of potential near-term violators. Focusing on the nuclear nonproliferation norm, we show statistically that enforcer responses appear to have affected whether states subsequently pursued the bomb historically and that this effect is stronger than other hypothesized determinants of proliferation decisions. We also use primary sources to document that policy makers recognized and heeded this influence in a range of cases.
Open Access
Proliferation and the logic of the nuclear market
(MIT Press Journals, 2019) Gheorghe, Eliza
The evolution of the nuclear market explains why there are only nine members of the nuclear club, not twenty-five or more, as some analysts predicted. In the absence of a supplier cartel that can regulate nuclear transfers, the more suppliers there are, the more intense their competition will be, as they vie for market share. This commercial rivalry makes it easier for nuclear technology to spread, because buyers can play suppliers off against each other. The ensuing transfers help countries either acquire nuclear weapons or become hedgers. The great powers (China, Russia, and the United States) seek to thwart proliferation by limiting transfers and putting safeguards on potentially dangerous nuclear technologies. Their success depends on two structural factors: the global distribution of power and the intensity of the security rivalry among them. Thwarters are most likely to stem proliferation when the system is unipolar and least likely when it is multipolar. In bipolarity, their prospects fall somewhere in between. In addition, the more intense the rivalry among the great powers in bipolarity and multipolarity, the less effective they will be at curbing proliferation. Given the potential for intense security rivalry among today's great powers, the shift from unipolarity to multipolarity does not portend well for checking proliferation.