The difficulty of easy projects

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buir.contributor.authorGitmez, A. Arda
buir.contributor.orcidGitmez, A. Arda|0000-0003-0944-7477
dc.citation.epage302en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber3en_US
dc.citation.spage285en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber3en_US
dc.contributor.authorDziuda, Wioletta
dc.contributor.authorGitmez, A. Arda
dc.contributor.authorShadmehr, Mehdi
dc.date.accessioned2022-02-14T11:22:48Z
dc.date.available2022-02-14T11:22:48Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractWe consider binary private contributions to public good projects that succeed when the number of contributors exceeds a threshold. We show that for standard distributions of contribution costs, valuable threshold public good projects are more likely to succeed when they require more contributors. Raising the success threshold reduces free-riding incentives, and this strategic effect dominates the direct effect. Common intuition that easier projects are more likely to succeed only holds for cost distributions with right tails fatter than Cauchy. Our results suggest government grants can reduce the likelihood that valuable threshold public good projects succeed.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1257/aeri.20200311en_US
dc.identifier.eissn1944-7981
dc.identifier.issn0002-8282
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/77326
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherAmerican Economic Associationen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aeri.20200311en_US
dc.source.titleAmerican Economic Reviewen_US
dc.titleThe difficulty of easy projectsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
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