Endogenous game choice and giving behavior in distribution games

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buir.contributor.authorKaragözoğlu, Emin
buir.contributor.orcidKaragözoğlu, Emin|0000-0003-2442-6949
dc.citation.epage32en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber6en_US
dc.citation.spage1en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber13en_US
dc.contributor.authorKaragözoğlu, Emin
dc.contributor.authorTosun, Elif
dc.date.accessioned2023-02-28T10:18:43Z
dc.date.available2023-02-28T10:18:43Z
dc.date.issued2022-11-03
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractWe experimentally investigated the effects of the possibility of taking in the dictator game and the choices of passive players between the dictator game and the taking game on the distribution decisions of active players. Our main findings support our hypothesis: when the dictator game is not exogenously given but chosen by the receivers (or passive players), this makes them accountable, which leads to less giving by dictators. We also conducted an online survey to gain further insights about our experimental results. Survey participants predicted most of the observed behavior in the experiment and explained the factors that might have driven the predicted behavior using reasoning similar to ours. Our results provide a new perspective for the dependence of giving in the dictator game on contextual factors. © 2022 by the authors.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.3390/g13060074en_US
dc.identifier.issn20734336
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/111902
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherMDPIen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g13060074en_US
dc.source.titleGamesen_US
dc.subjectAccountabilityen_US
dc.subjectDictator gameen_US
dc.subjectEndogenous game choiceen_US
dc.subjectExperimental economicsen_US
dc.subjectTaking behavioren_US
dc.titleEndogenous game choice and giving behavior in distribution gamesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
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