Bargaining under time pressure from deadlines

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buir.contributor.authorKaragözoğlu, Emin
dc.citation.epage440en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber2en_US
dc.citation.spage419en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber22en_US
dc.contributor.authorKaragözoğlu, Eminen_US
dc.contributor.authorKocher, M. G.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-02-03T12:56:06Z
dc.date.available2020-02-03T12:56:06Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractWe experimentally investigate the effect of time pressure from deadlines in a rich-context bargaining game with an induced reference point at the 2/3-1/3 distribution. Our results show that first proposals, concessions, and settlements are very similar for different time-pressure levels. Nevertheless, time pressure systematically influences the type of agreements reached: the likelihood of bargainers reaching agreements on the equal split is lower under time pressure. Furthermore, disagreements and last-moment-agreements (conditional on reaching an agreement) are more frequently observed under time pressure, though the effect on last-moment agreements disappears when disagreements are included in the analysis. Finally, the effect of time-pressure on the frequency of disagreements is stronger for those pairs with higher tension in first proposals.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10683-018-9579-yen_US
dc.identifier.issn1386-4157
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/53003
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9579-yen_US
dc.source.titleExperimental Economicsen_US
dc.subjectBargainingen_US
dc.subjectDeadline effecten_US
dc.subjectDisagreementsen_US
dc.subjectReference pointsen_US
dc.subjectTime pressureen_US
dc.titleBargaining under time pressure from deadlinesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
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